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Studying Hostile, Deceptive, and Dangerous Surroundings

Report of a Workshop on Social Research Methods for Non-Permissive Environments

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Royal Military College of Canada

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RMCC Serial No. 2009-0302-SLA-PR09002

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Abstract

A one-day workshop was held at RMC to explore social research methods for hostile, difficult, deceptive and dangerous environments within which government pursues security objectives. Four panels addressed: qualitative anthropological methods within a theatre; financial analysis to assess the environment surrounding a theatre; police tools in domestic operations; and the use of polls and surveys in difficult environments. A final session permitted practitioners to comment on the material. Practitioners, academics, and government officials discussed these issues without being individually identified. Interviews, focus groups, combat ethnography, and insider-outsider research can help to map social microcosms within a theatre. Financial analysis tools can help to provide a more comprehensive context for these microcosms, and also track individuals and enterprises with security implications. Police tools are tailored to find usable evidence and domestic courts shape practice, limiting applicability of these tools to foreign operations. Polls and surveys should be tailored to the social context of their targets and validated. Often indirect questions are more effective. Practitioners confirmed the importance of multi-method approaches, and close cooperation between field and 'lab' to bring critical social science into practice.

Résumé

Un atelier d'une journée a été tenu au CMR pour explorer des méthodes sociales de recherches pour les environnements hostiles, difficiles, trompeurs et dangereux dans lesquels le gouvernement poursuit des objectifs de sécurité. Quatre panneaux ont adressé : méthodes anthropologiques qualitatives dans un théâtre ; analyse financière pour évaluer l'environnement entourant un théâtre outils de police dans des exécutions domestiques ; et l'utilisation des sondages dans les environnements difficiles. Une session finale a permis à des praticiens de présenter ses observations sur le matériel. Les praticiens, les universitaires, et les fonctionnaires de gouvernement ont discuté ces issues sans être individuellement identifié. Les entrevues, les groupes cibles, l'ethnographie de combat, et la recherche d'initié étranger peuvent aider à tracer les microcosmes sociaux dans un théâtre. Les outils d'analyse financière peuvent aider à fournir un cadre plus complet pour ces microcosmes, et identifient également des individus et des entreprises avec des implications de sécurité. Des outils de police sont spécialisés pour trouver l'évidence utilisable. Vue que les cours domestiques forment la pratique, ces outils ne sont pas très applicables aux opérations étrangères. Des sondages devraient êtres conçus en fonction du contexte social de leurs cibles et devrait être validés. Les questions indirectes sont souvent plus pertinentes. Les praticiens ont réaffirmé l'importance des approches de multi méthode, et de la collaboration étroite entre la zone et laboratoire pour apporter la science social critique en pratique.

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Executive Summary

Studying Hostile, Deceptive, and Dangerous Surroundings Report of a Workshop on Social Research Methods for Non-Permissive Environments

David Last; Jordan Axani; Melissa Jennings; DRDC CR 2010-122; DRDC Toronto; 2010.

Introduction

Most social research is conducted in permissive environments, which are safe (though not necessarily comfortable), straightforward, and not time-critical. Research to enhance human and national security must often answer questions in or about non-permissive environments. These may be hostile (people are trying to kill each other, if not the researcher), dangerous (with many non-intentional physical risks like landmines or crime), deceptive (at least some people are trying to obscure the truth or mislead researchers, perhaps with hostile intent), manipulative (some people will try to use the research process for malign purposes), and time-critical because of the aims of the sponsor.

This workshop brought together military and civilian social scientists and public servants with diverse backgrounds, some of whom have worked in non-permissive environments, with police, financial and economic analysts, pollsters, and intelligence experts to help triangulate methods to understand complex social processes in non-permissive environments. Research tools can be applied to understand social phenomena from both within and outside non-permissive environments.

Results

The ethnographic panel suggested that life history interviewing by a culturally aware and linguistically competent outsider over a period of more than a year can yield a good picture of social dynamics in the hinterland of a post-conflict society. Recruiting insiders to collect information, and validating that information through focus groups in the presence of an outsider with access to resources may yield better results in less time. Combat ethnography by armed and uniformed personnel is problematic, but there may be scope for an academic support network of the sort proposed by an American university.

The second panel addressed financial and economic analysis from three perspectives. A chartered management accountant presented the intelligence application of financial analysis tools, particularly the assessments of rating agencies like Standard and Poor's. National financial intelligence units like FINTRAC have only emerged since the 1980s, and are increasingly important institutions for understanding criminal economic activities. It is conceivable that financial intelligence tools will become more important for understanding concerted attacks on the economic interests of the state in a global economy. The third speaker demonstrated the use of open news sources for mapping events in a non-permissive environment like the Niger Delta. It is plausible that these three approaches can be combined to provide a more complete image of economic factors impinging on national security.

The third panel addressed security intelligence and policing tools. Security intelligence agencies rely heavily on open sources, and prefer to cite the lowest classification for the widest distribution. Reports typically use open source intelligence to set the stage, even when classified details form the basis of advice. Outreach to academic contributors is an important source of insight but will always be a one-way

relationship, because there are things intelligence agencies cannot share. Academics should be aware that they are not in possession of all the facts (no one is) and should therefore be circumspect in pronouncing the absence of threats, which can undermine trust in security agencies. Police investigators use electronic surveillance, informants, search and seizure, and forensic analysis. Database searches in collaboration with FINTRAC are increasingly important. Because domestic proceeds of crime investigations operate under the constraint of law and the Charter of Rights, it is difficult to get a conviction. A supporting paper attached but not presented describes the application of Special Forces techniques to police intelligence collection, and its particular utility in remote rural areas. This is one of the fields in which police and military techniques appear to be converging.

The final panel addressed the use of polls and surveys to support operations. Personnel selection officers have been employed as "human effects coordinators" using direct and indirect observation, interviews, surveys and focus groups to determine the impact of allied operations on local populations. They developed "measures of performance" based on relationships with locals and results of focus groups, and "measures of output" based on quantitative measures of change, such as the number of IED strikes in a vicinity. Officers found that passive observation was a more fruitful collection technique in the early stages of a mission, and that focus groups were more productive when split horizontally, so that senior participants did not dominate. One presenter argued that the limited statistical knowledge of senior officers constrained the tools for campaign analysis. Another speaker, however, noted that good design is more important than statistical tools, because a statistician can fix bad analysis, but poorly designed research cannot be salvaged. Both comments suggest more effort to educate commanders in the use of supporting research to guide campaigns. Good surveys will always produce paradoxical and often conflicting answers, because people have complex and conflicting views about most subjects. It is important to design surveys with a broad focus, starting with general questions, using local knowledge and language, and allowing an opportunity for nuanced responses.

Practitioners from several government departments provided feedback on the social research methods discussed in the workshop, emphasising the importance of multiple methods, using insiders and locals as partners in research, and linking research to policy. Several speakers agreed that small gatherings of policy-oriented researchers were a useful way of advancing the rigor of methods and the relevance of research. Those engaged in operations often do not have the time to reflect much on what they are doing or how to do it better, and this facility for critical thought and analysis must be brought to operations by social scientists familiar with operational problems.

Significance

The sponsors are particularly interested in understanding the intent of adversaries and developing tools to influence them. Research about adversary intent will be conducted in a non-permissive environment, but the workshop demonstrated that this does not preclude the use of open sources, that relevant research can be also done outside the non-permissive environment and that sharing between academic researchers and multiple government agencies can be useful.

Military intelligence efforts have evolved to include joint, multinational, inter-agency and civil-military tools. The presentations and discussion at the workshop illustrated the potential for combining micro-level ethnographic tools with macro-level surveys and polls, and financial and economic intelligence to describe the larger environment within which an adversary is pursuing hostile intent. Financial and economic intelligence tools may also help to identify unsuspected adversaries or damaging developments with security implications. The inclusion of police methods in the workshop was significant both because social network analysis and investigative tools may be applicable in foreign military theatres, and because military tools are already being applied in police investigations of remote and difficult criminal targets in Canada, and this expertise is applicable to any future domestic terror group or insurgency.

Combining tools used by different agencies, making these agencies aware of academic practice and research tools, and developing links between agencies with congruent interests is an important step towards more coherent intelligence and security research.

Future Plans

This workshop was mounted at short notice, and although it was successful in bringing together diverse participants, many suggested the utility to repeating the exercise at regular intervals to increase the cooperation and mutual understanding between different agencies involved in related forms of assessment. For example, Export Development Canada (EDC) must assess the risk associated with international investment ventures, and international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank have sections that assess conflict environments. Future methods workshops could help to develop a community of practice, which could support decision-making on national security issues.

Sommaire

Étudier des milieux hostiles, trompeurs et dangereux – Rapport concernant un atelier sur les méthodes de recherche sociale en milieu non permissif

David Last; Jordan Axani; Melissa Jennings; RDDC CR 2010-122; R&D pour la défense Canada – Toronto; 2010.

Introduction

La majeure partie de la recherche sociale se déroule dans des milieux permissifs, soit sécuritaires (mais pas nécessairement confortables), simples et où le temps ne presse pas. La recherche visant l'amélioration de la sécurité des personnes et d'un pays doit souvent chercher réponse dans un milieu non permissif ou ses environs. Les milieux peuvent être hostiles (les gens s'entretuent ou tentent de tuer le chercheur), dangereux (c'est-à-dire comporter des risques physiques non intentionnels comme des mines ou le crime), trompeurs (certaines personnes tentent de camoufler la vérité ou de tromper les chercheurs, peut-être pour des motifs hostiles), teintés de manipulation (certaines personnes tenteront d'utiliser le processus de recherche à des fins malveillantes) et le temps peut y être compté, vu les objectifs du commanditaire.

Lors de l'atelier, des spécialistes en sciences sociales militaires et civils et des fonctionnaires aux divers antécédents qui avaient travaillé dans des milieux non permissifs ainsi que des policiers, des analystes économiques et financiers, des enquêteurs et des spécialistes du renseignement ont tenté de trianguler les méthodes et de comprendre les processus sociaux complexes présents au sein des milieux non permissifs. Les outils de recherche peuvent servir à comprendre un phénomène social depuis l'intérieur ou l'extérieur d'un milieu non permissif.

Résultats

Le comité sur l'ethnographie a indiqué que si un étranger versé dans la culture et la langue d'un endroit interrogeait les gens sur le cycle de vie pendant plus d'un an, il pourrait obtenir un bon portrait de la dynamique sociale de l'arrière-pays d'une société d'après-conflit. Recruter des initiés pour recueillir de l'information, puis valider l'information à l'aide de groupes de consultation en présence d'un étranger ayant accès aux ressources pourrait donner de meilleurs résultats plus rapidement. L'ethnographie en milieu de combat, effectuée par un personnel armé et en uniforme, pose problème, mais il y a possibilité d'un réseau de soutien académique proposé par une université américaine.

Le deuxième comité s'est penché sur l'analyse financière et économique selon trois perspectives. Un comptable en gestion agréé a démontré l'application, dans le domaine du renseignement, des outils d'analyse financière, particulièrement les évaluations des agences de notation comme Standard & Poor's. Les organismes de renseignement financier nationaux comme le CANAFE n'existent que depuis les années 80 et servent de plus en plus à comprendre les activités économiques criminelles. Il est possible que les outils de renseignement financier prennent une nouvelle importance pour ce qui est de comprendre les offensives concertées contre les intérêts économiques de l'État au sein de l'économie mondiale. Un autre conférencier a souligné l'utilité des sources ouvertes médiatiques pour repérer les événements dans un milieu non permissif tel que le Delta du Niger. Il est possible de combiner les trois méthodes pour obtenir une image plus détaillée des facteurs économiques ayant une influence sur la sécurité nationale.

Le troisième comité s'est penché sur les outils de renseignement de sécurité et de maintien de l'ordre. Les services de renseignement de sécurité se fient beaucoup aux sources ouvertes et préfèrent utiliser la plus faible classification pour une plus grande distribution. Habituellement, dans un rapport, les renseignements tirés de sources ouvertes servent à établir la base, même lorsque des détails classifiés sont à la source de la recommandation. Les relations avec les universitaires représentent une importante source d'idées, mais seront aussi toujours à sens unique, car les services de renseignement ne peuvent pas tout divulguer. Les universitaires devraient avoir conscience de ne pas posséder tous les faits (personne ne les possède) et devraient donc s'exprimer avec circonspection quand ils déclarent l'absence de menace. Cela peut en effet miner la confiance accordée aux services de renseignement. Les enquêteurs de la police utilisent la surveillance électronique, des informateurs, des fouilles, des saisies et des analyses judiciaires. Les vérifications réalisées dans les bases de données en collaboration avec le CANAFE ont une importance grandissante. Puisque les procédures internes des enquêtes criminelles sont soumises à la Loi et à la Charte des droits et libertés, il est difficile d'obtenir une condamnation. Un document d'appui (ci-joint, mais pas abordé) décrit l'application des techniques des forces spéciales dans le cadre de la collecte de renseignements par la police et leur utilité particulière dans les régions rurales reculées. Il s'agit d'un des secteurs où les techniques policières et militaires semblent converger.

Le dernier comité a abordé l'utilisation des sondages et des enquêtes pour appuyer les opérations. Les officiers de sélection du personnel ont été employés comme « coordonnateurs des effets sur les humains » en utilisant l'observation directe et indirecte, des entrevues, des sondages et des groupes de consultation pour déterminer l'effet des opérations communes sur la population locale. Ils ont établi des « mesures de rendement » fondées sur les relations avec les habitants et les résultats des groupes de consultation ainsi que des « mesures de production » basées sur la mesure quantitative du changement, par exemple le nombre d'attentats à l'engin explosif improvisé dans un secteur. Selon les officiers, l'observation passive était la technique de collecte la plus fructueuse au début d'une mission, et les groupes de consultation étaient plus productifs lorsque divisés horizontalement afin d'empêcher les participants plus âgés de dominer les autres. Un conférencier a souligné que les connaissances limitées des officiers principaux en matière de statistique restreignaient l'usage des outils pour l'analyse de la campagne. Cependant, un autre conférencier a mentionné que la bonne conception est plus importante que les outils statistiques, car un statisticien peut rectifier une mauvaise analyse, mais une recherche mal faite est irrécupérable. Selon les remarques de ces conférenciers, il faut encore s'efforcer d'apprendre aux dirigeants à se servir de la recherche à l'appui des campagnes. Les bons sondages donneront toujours lieu à des réponses paradoxales et souvent contradictoires, car les gens ont des opinions complexes et contradictoires sur la plupart des sujets. Il est important de créer des sondages à large portée, en ayant recours à des questions générales, à la langue et aux connaissances locales, en plus d'offrir l'occasion de donner des réponses nuancées.

Des spécialistes de plusieurs ministères ont prononcé des remarques sur les méthodes de recherche sociale abordées au cours de l'atelier et ont souligné l'importance d'utiliser plusieurs méthodes, de collaborer avec des initiés et des habitants de l'endroit pendant la recherche et de lier la recherche aux politiques. Plusieurs conférenciers étaient d'accord pour dire que des rencontres de petits groupes de chercheurs orientés vers les programmes étaient utiles à l'avancement de la rigueur des méthodes et à la pertinence de la recherche. Souvent, ceux qui participent aux opérations n'ont pas le temps de réfléchir à leurs méthodes et aux façons de les améliorer. Cette aptitude pour la pensée critique et l'analyse doit être insérée dans les opérations par les spécialistes en sciences sociales au courant des problèmes opérationnels.

Portée

Les commanditaires souhaitent particulièrement comprendre les intentions des adversaires et mettre au point des outils pour les influencer. La recherche sur les intentions des adversaires se déroule dans un

milieu non permissif, mais l'atelier a prouvé que cela n'exclut pas l'utilisation des sources ouvertes, que la recherche pertinente peut également avoir lieu à l'extérieur du milieu non permissif et que la communication entre les chercheurs universitaires et les différents ministères et organismes gouvernementaux peut se révéler utile.

Les efforts militaires de collecte de renseignement ont évolué pour inclure des outils communs, multinationaux, interservices et civil-militaire. Au cours de l'atelier, les exposés et les discussions ont illustré la possibilité de combiner les outils d'ethnographie de microniveau aux sondages, aux études de macroniveau et aux renseignements économiques et financiers pour décrire l'ensemble du milieu dans lequel un adversaire aux intentions hostiles évolue. Les outils liés aux renseignements financiers et économiques peuvent également permettre de repérer les adversaires insoupçonnés ou les changements négatifs ayant des répercussions sur la sécurité. L'inclusion des méthodes de la police dans l'atelier était importante, car les analyses de réseau social et les outils d'enquête pourraient servir dans des situations vécues par l'armée à l'étranger. De plus, les outils militaires sont déjà utilisés dans le cadre d'enquêtes policières visant des cibles criminelles lointaines ou difficiles au Canada, et ces connaissances spécialisées sont applicables à tout groupe ou à toute insurrection terroriste à venir au pays.

Combiner les outils des différents services, sensibiliser les services à propos des techniques et des outils de recherche universitaires et établir des liens entre les services ayant des intérêts semblables représente un pas important vers une plus grande cohérence des recherches en matière de sécurité et de renseignement.

Projets

L'atelier a été organisé en très peu de temps, mais a tout de même réuni divers participants. Bon nombre d'entre eux ont suggéré de répéter l'exercice régulièrement pour intensifier la collaboration et la compréhension entre les différents services qui réalisent des évaluations liées au sujet. Par exemple, Exportation et développement Canada (EDC) doit évaluer les risques liés aux investissements internationaux, et les institutions financières internationales comme le FMI, la Banque mondiale et la Banque interaméricaine possèdent des sections vouées à l'évaluation des milieux en conflit. Les ateliers à venir permettraient la création d'une communauté de pratique pour soutenir la prise de décisions sur les questions liées à la sécurité nationale.

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1 Record of Discussion

1.1 Opening Remarks

1.1.1 Commandant's Welcome

The Commandant of the Royal Military College of Canada opened the workshop, noting the longstanding contributions of the College to defence research and education. This workshop on social research methods in non-permissive environments is precisely the sort of event that takes advantage of RMC's dual nature – an academic and military establishment with access to government and private resources. The workshop is important, because it will help security researchers and practitioners to understand complex, difficult and dangerous environments better. Ultimately, this is about saving Canadian lives. Today's security challenges take us far beyond the battlefield, and the new frontier for operations is joint, inter-agency, multinational, and civil-military, so participants have much to learn from each other.

Beyond the exchange of technical information, tools and techniques, workshops like this help to cement professional relationships, which are increasingly important in addressing new security challenges. One of RMC's first graduates, Aylesworth Bowen Perry, was the first RCMP commissioner of the twenty-first century, exemplifying the sort of connection that the Departments of National Defence, Public Safety, and other agencies concerned with security will have to cultivate if they are to meet new security challenges.

The Commandant concluded by thanking the sponsors and organizers: Defence Research and Development Canada, Defence and Security Research Institute, and the College's academic and administrative staff.

1.1.2 Principal's Welcome – Chatham House Rule

One of the great strengths of the university environment is that it cuts across the organizational lines that often separate analysis into silos. This workshop offers an opportunity for FINTRAC, Public Safety, the RCMP, National Defence and experienced academic field workers to learn from each other.

A second advantage is that the Royal Military College is connected to a wider academic and international community through a network of defence and security institutions, and through the wide-ranging research of our faculty.

A third advantage is that at RMC, we understand government better than some academics, and as public servants ourselves, we are not hostile or suspicious of it, but understand how it serves the public. In keeping with that spirit, the discussions today are conducted under the "Chatham House Rule". There is only one rule: **whatever is said here may be used by the participants, but will not be associated with the names or organizations of participants**. All views and perspectives expressed are understood to be strictly personal. The Chatham House Rule is intended to stimulate frank and open discussion.

RMC is a university with a difference, and each of the participating individuals and organizations might consider it as a resource. Most of our students are cadets or serving officers and will go on to serve in the Canadian Forces. Many of our civilian graduate students will also go on to public service, and RMC's graduate programs may be of interest to other government departments or students from civilian universities interested in security studies.

1.1.3 Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)

The Head of the Adversarial Intent Section of Defence Research and Development Canada spoke as the sponsor of the workshop. The Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) group has a project to enhance "influence operations", for which an understanding of how to do social research in non-permissive environments is expected to be useful.

The primary stakeholder in this research is the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM). They are particularly interested in improved understanding of the human and social environments in which our forces deploy, in order to shape information operations that are intended to influence adversaries.

Other stakeholders have joined together in the Influence Activities Task Force, which includes groups that enable influence, including psychological operations, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), and others. Participants were asked to keep these enablers in mind during the discussions. In order to generate effects in the human domain, we need to have a sophisticated understanding of how that domain works, so collecting and analysing data in non-permissive environments is central to what we are trying to do.

1.1.4 Defence and Security Research Institute (DSRI)

The Defence and Security Research Institute is a comparatively new joint venture between RMC and DRDC, launched in 2008. It aims to leverage the university environment to sponsor events like today's workshop. This is the third workshop that DSRI has produced recently, and the first in the research area of pursuit labelled 'security policy in the human domain'. Participants were invited to contact DSRI if they wished to pursue research collaboration in any of the five research areas of pursuit, the other four being: power and energy, communications, materials, and the environment.

1.2 Ethnography and Qualitative Collection

Three academic researchers discussed qualitative assessment methods suitable for capturing elements of complex social reality using anthropological and ethnographic methods. The first sought to understand how peasants affected by violence exercised their agency to reconstitute social networks after the Rwandan genocide. The researcher used life history interviewing to establish 'ground truth' amongst remote and disenfranchised populations affected by the genocide. The sophisticated elites with whom Westerners habitually deal in the course of an intervention tend to be linked to the West by language, culture and geography in ways that are alien to the population at large. Life history interviewing requires a lengthy trust-building phase of 'hanging out' and competence in the local language and culture. It is time consuming, and can be impeded by the growing control of its hinterland by the post-conflict state, (the researcher was detained and sent for re-education) however it provides a more complete picture of the context, tools and motivations arising from conflict experience. Research ethics procedures had to be adjusted to permit verbal consent. Confidentiality and anonymity were difficult to achieve in the politicized environment, and there is a risk that informants will be targeted based on association.

The Small Worlds Ethnographic Assessment Team (SWEAT) conducted team interviews in American sectors in Aghanistan in 2007, and the experiment forms the basis for a public-private-university partnership proposal from a major American university. Unlike Human Terrain Assessment Teams, SWEAT attempts to engage for a longer period in place, and establish an ethnographic baseline for protracted operations in order to inform policy and interagency cooperation. The project's aim is to create a system of networks to support training, education, research, modelling, analysis, simulation and subject

matter expertise to meet CENTCOM's cultural needs in support of military and stability operations. The team consisted of military ethnographers trained by US SOF for situational awareness, and embedded in military units. They participated in patrols and worked at the village level, treating qualitative data collection as part of a holistic system. Work in a combat zone created risks for researchers and informants, which were minimized by building long-term relationships and minimizing in-theatre recording. The innovation here lay not in the collection, but in the vision of a networked partnership of culturally aware military and civilian Americans to support policy-making and operations.

The third ethnographer used innovative insider-outsider strategies in field research on former child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Recognizing that a white foreigner would have limited access and a distorted view, the researcher recruited members of the target group to conduct the interviews with their peers. Interviews were followed by focus groups. Focus groups generated more accurate narratives because peers tended to correct inaccuracies and misrepresentations. Partnership with a local NGO helped provide better access and follow-up with participants. In a related project, disposable cameras were dispensed to allow participants to capture representative images, enhancing their 'voice' in the project. Participants were rewarded with training and educational opportunities. Interpreting the stories collected by the insiders helped to understand how the atrocities had been enabled, and how identity had changed as a result of the experiences. Both denial and exaggeration were problems in many narratives. Although the young 'insiders' were better at collecting stories, the researcher found that as an outsider, she was able to ask questions the insiders could not.

1.2.1 Gaining Trust and Building Relationships in Vulnerable, Politicized Populations

The first anthropologist began by commenting that military forces often don't aim to get close to people in order to understand them – that is not their primary role, and images of armed military troops in defensive posture stand in stark contrast to really understanding the environment in which they are operating. Her research, on the other hand, involved ethnography of a highly politicized environment – the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.

The anthropological approach to research acknowledges that government exerts considerable control over the social and political environment, and in many ways the power relations in Rwanda are very similar to those that existed before the conflict. Her focus was on remote areas, where 65 percent of the population lives, and subsists on less than 25 cents a day. This rural peasant life, hundreds of kilometres away from the urban centres with which international agencies normally deal, is the heartland of Rwanda's politicized environment. A hands-on method puts both the researcher and respondents at some risk, if they do not work with social and political reality. Marginal individuals have little opportunity to exercise power. Small and isolated groups, like the Twa, are particularly vulnerable and urgently need special legal protections.

Anthropological research in politicized environments requires careful preparation, cultivation of personal relations, and a willingness to meet research subjects on their own terms; it is difficult and time-consuming. But it is also essential, because policy-makers tend to rely on elites in urban centres. Elites have their own agendas. Rwandan elites, for example, choose to convey a particular image of successful post-conflict reintegration, but may represent as little as 8 to 10 percent of the population.

The anthropologist's background will shape the method and approach to research. In this case, the aim was to understand how peasants who had been affected by political violence exercised their agency in order to reconstitute social networks. To answer this question, the researcher spoke directly to individual peasants based on their position in the social structure. Scott's work on "everyday acts of resistance" by

peasants was particularly influential in conceptualizing relations in power structures.[1] She was looking, in effect, for ways in which the weak and marginalized would respond when they saw government policies as illegitimate, or were unable to reconcile official narratives with their experience.

The field research was interrupted, and informed, by a five week enforced period of re-education in one of the government-run *Ingando* Camps, intended to educate the researcher about the good work the government had been doing on post-conflict reconciliation. This raises the question of some of the obstacles to anthropological fieldwork in a post-conflict society, in which the government is asserting the sovereignty and control vested in the government's vision of the state. Researchers need permits from the Rwandan Government, and are required to present credentials and papers in order to speak to individual peasants. This is becoming more and more common across Africa. Rwanda requires a $2500 fee and a Rwandan Government ethics approval process simply to initiate research. It's important to note, however, that this access is negotiated with elites in Kigali.

After gaining access through the processes dictated by elites in the capital, a researcher still has to meet people on their own terms, go to them in the fields, roadways, or market places: "I never began by asking questions; I would just 'hang out' with them." An issue under continual review was the problem of permission. Permission has to be continuous throughout the protracted process during which the researcher is building up trust; there is no clear starting point where a permission form is signed. After a certain amount of time, which varies from individual to individual, the researcher seeks verbal permission to make a digital recording of the conversation. At multiple points over many conversations, the researcher checks back with individuals to ensure both the veracity of the account and the continued permission.

In selecting interview subjects, the researcher did not sample on ethnicity. First, this is not a respectful way of identifying people who, as individuals, have multiple dimensions to their identity. Second, the government has made labelling by ethnic identity illegal. At the peasant level, ethnicity did not seem to matter much in rural areas.

Throughout the research, there was an evident willingness to share experiences. Individuals *wanted* to tell their stories, and in some ways the researcher becomes a sort of therapist. This can be emotionally draining, and planning downtime is important. The sight of a white foreigner running tends to instil panic, so yoga or some form of private exercise is better. Being alone was also helpful because people with difficult stories would sometimes seek her out when they knew her to be alone.

The sharing of secrets is a difficult art. Command of the local language is essential. The researcher found a book of proverbs and a language book helpful. Introducing an interpreter changed the dynamic. To the researcher's surprise, young women who had been raped preferred young men to act as interpreters, because their experience was so different that they could not identify with the story. Stories of rape and atrocity often were first told as, "this happened to my sister," and would only later be retold in the first person. Individuals tend to become committed to their stories through the telling, and it was necessary to put the story in the broader context of the conflict.

What individuals told her about the violence differs from the mainstream narrative. Ethnicity is important for elites, but not for peasants in remote areas, *until* they come into contact with the state. They live as neighbours and friends, but as they get closer to the power of the state [over land tenure, marriage, or benefits] then ethnic identity becomes more salient.

[1] James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.

Research partnerships, with interpreters and local individuals, were varied over the life of the project. More than twenty possible interpreters were interviewed, and the extent to which they would be acknowledged was individually negotiated.

The basic method for conducting interviews was "life history interviewing" – a prolonged interview intended to be conducted over 14 months, but compressed to five due to delays and the enforced stay in the *Ingando* camp. Her interview subjects wanted her to keep writing their stories; there was clearly informed consent. Soldiers reported all visits to her accommodations, so there was some inherent risk to respondents. The research was enabled by having spent seven years in Rwanda prior, and having a young son with her; both these factors were an important part of the deep relationship-building that invoked a therapeutic role.

Confidentiality and anonymity of respondents were not possible in the telling of stories. It only became possible in the subsequent writing of the stories. Several techniques increased confidence. In many cases, particularly early in relationships, she would avoid digital voice recording. It can take two years or more to develop a comfort level necessary for confidence, and typically took at least five or six sessions before respondents began to open up. In some cases, the researcher tried to write up an interview to show a respondent how the information would be used, but since few could read, this tended to backfire and reduce confidence. Translators did not know each other, and therefore interacted only through her. One interpreter would transcribe an interview that another interpreter had translated. Prisons were particularly challenging interview sites, and it was important never to see a prisoner alone.

In a final note on the role of anthropology after conflicts, the researcher noted that US Africa Command (AFRICOM) works with anthropologists, and that these scholars sometimes become outcast from the academic community.[2] This researcher, however, remains convinced that micro-level ethnographic research can be done usefully, without imposing harm, in support of the legitimate interests of the most marginalized populations.

1.2.2 High Risk Ethnography and 'Small Worlds' Project Teams

The second speaker in the first panel was also engaged in ethnographic research, but in a militarized environment – a practitioner of "combat ethnography". The first part of the presentation addressed the sources and methods of fieldwork, and the second addressed the potential for a public-private-academic partnership to support US strategic goals.

Combat ethnography is a contentious field. As one of the original architects of the human terrain systems approach, she objects to labelling ethnography as "the Pentagon's new weapon in COIN". The presentation focused on the conduct of a particular mission in eastern Afghanistan in late 2007, but illustrated the project sponsored by the Naval Post Graduate School. The work of the small worlds teams hearkens back to Stanley Milgram's work on small worlds (1967).[3]

Small Worlds Ethnographic Assessment Teams are very different from human terrain assessment teams, and are not well known because much of their work has been classified. The only reason for classification is to protect the identity of ethnographic informants. We do not use the normal tools available to traditional fieldworkers such as audiovisual recording equipment, because it could result in attacks on informants. Instead, small world teams rely on stripped down field notes. Teams are trained by former

[2] See, for example, the debate and references at http://zeroanthropology.net/2010/03/27/africom-human-terrain-empire-and-anthropology/

[3] Stanley Milgram, "The Small World Problem". *Psychology Today*, 1(1), May 1967. pp 60-67

special forces NCOs and officers in order to retain situational awareness of the military mission and risks. The teams are embedded in military units, not auxiliary to it.

Although we work at the tactical level, we are acutely aware that tactical incidents can reverberate at the strategic level. For example, there was an incident in which soccer balls with Koranic verses were distributed by USAID, and there was an uproar over the foot touching the sacred verses.

The teams work in both permissive and non-permissive environments, supporting not only military but also civilian and non-governmental organization objectives. The data collected was part of a holistic system from data collection, to data management to computation and modelling. But you can imagine the effort to create a "Hal 9000" computer,[4] which predicts social behaviour, and as social scientists, we know that that is not going to work. So what we are trying to do is create a system for capturing this data so that we develop a common lexicon of terminologies for communication between the different combatant commands. We learned on September 11th that what happens across the world can affect our shores, so we are not geocentric; what happens in PACOM affects AFRICOM, and what happens in AFRICOM affects CENTCOM, so we are trying to provide useful social science support for operations. Military knowledge will have to evolve to decide how to apply that knowledge across borders.

The team leader was a retired Colonel (06). We worked in uniform and carried weapons. This does cause a lot of concern amongst civilian colleagues. The main reason for carrying weapons is to blend in with the military organization because there are snipers, and high visibility of specialists would endanger the unit they are with. Weapons are for defensive purposes only. All personnel get weapons and vehicle training before deployment, but they do not participate in military operations like cordon-and-search, nor engage in any offensive operations. They do, however, receive all the necessary training for their own safety.

When we conduct interviews, we put our weapons aside. Weapons are ubiquitous, but we are careful to ensure that our ethnographic informant is not threatened or apprehensive in any way. Most participants in thousands of interviews expected people in uniform to have weapons, and expected that those who were armed and in uniform would provide security for them, and in some cases this was awkward.

In our interviews, as the previous speaker noted, we are looking for micro-narratives. Our job is to provide a sense of the validity of the observations of civil affairs, information operations, civilian workers and NGOs that have come into contact with this population. Are they all saying the same thing? I aggregate that information in the course of an ethnographic interview, to see if there are crosscurrents, to provide a synthesis, to triangulate what is going on. Remember that this is time sensitive. We're not looking for a perfect answer.

Because we are dealing with a largely illiterate population, permission is verbal. If interview subjectes do not grant verbal permission, the interview ends. If there is active intelligence, indicating immediate danger to civilians or to troops, then that is passed on. Any other time, intelligence is not passed on. We have privileged access to outlying populations, and work hard to maintain their trust.

Often we find ourselves in the role of coach, helping others to run meetings or 'shura' from which we gain general information about how things work. We do veterinary and medical work, and get involved in whatever that unit is doing for the local community; this helps to build the relationship. On one visit to tribal elders, an ethnographic researcher was "sold" for two goats in a mock wedding party. This helps explain the nature of the work. The continuity of the relationship is critical, but difficulty to maintain

[4] HAL 9000 is a reference to the fictional computer in Arthur C. Clarke's Space Odyssey saga.

because of the rotation schedule, and the comparatively short time in theatre for many of the military and civilian personnel.

The second part of the presentation concerns the process model for security, stability, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR).[5] This is an interagency effort mounted by an American university to support the Department of Defence and other defence contractors. The team includes the Office of Naval Research as sponsor and governmental advisor, eight public and private universities, and two private industry partners engaged in field operations and technical support.

The multidisciplinary university research initiative (MURI) is based on field operations like the one just described, for which the founding principle is that no harm comes to the ethnographic informers, or to the researchers. This is supported by analysis in a number of American and foreign universities. Other institutions and agencies are invited to join in the process of developing this research network.

1.2.3 Reliability and Validity of Narrative Data from Multiple Sources

The final speaker on the first panel has experience researching child soldiers in several regions of the world over the last seven years, and addressed specific challenges of understanding the child soldier experience in Sierra Leone.

Typical images abound of adolescent males holding guns, but these images tend to mythologize the role of child soldier and paint them as victims. The goal of the research was to understand how that young person came to pick up the gun in the first place, and what happens in the aftermath of a conflict when the ex-child soldier puts down the gun. By putting this in context, and doing the research with and by child soldiers, it was possible to identify challenges and opportunities in the research process.

The research asked how recruitment into conflict worked, particularly by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). All the children involved in the research were forcibly recruited by the RUF. They took on a variety of roles during the conflict, including supportive roles as cooks, carrying guns and ammunition, human shields, and so on. Although these are called 'supportive' roles, they are fundamental to the conduct of the war, not peripheral at all. Many of the young people became commanders and leaders of their own units of child soldiers.

How are child soldiers made? What enables atrocities to be committed, or their identities to be changed, and what are the short- and long-term implications of their participation in violence? What happens to these young people after the conflict, and what is the process of reintegration into communities after the conflict? These children are often forced to shift in a very short time span from a highly structured military environment to a civilian environment in which they are isolated from norms and institutions [like those of school and family] that normally support children. How do they carve out their new identity?

What challenges do they face in terms of their own self-concepts? A major issue that many children face is the reality of family rejection, community ostracism, and the consequent move that many of them make

[5] Editor's note: This part of the presentation relates to US Department of Defence Work dating back at least to 2008. See, for example, Dr. Stuart H. Starr and Dr. Michael J. Baranick, "Transitioning Human, Social, Cultural Behavior (HSCB) Models and Simulations to the Operational User," Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), National Defense University (NDU) Fort Lesley McNair, Washington, DC 20319 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada489736&Location=U2

from their villages of origin to major cities like Freetown. It was particularly difficult for girls who faced rejection and stigmatization, for transgressing gender roles, suffering sexual aggression and bearing children of rape. All these factors mean that they cannot return to their families. After the conflict, there were few employment opportunities in Sierra Leone, the main ones being labour in the open-pit diamond mines and small trade in the slums of Freetown and other large cities. Many of them felt that they had been better off during the war; they had the power of guns, access to food, and a sense of purpose. There was sometimes a sense of nostalgia for the war years.

The researcher then addressed the methodology used in two studies. The first study involved in-depth interviews with 80 former child soldiers, 40 boys and 40 girls, in four regions of Sierra Leone, both urban and rural. They had all been associated with the RUF, abducted between infancy (as young as four) up to 13. These children did not remember abduction; they had grown up with the RUF. They had spent between three months and eight years with the RUF, spending their most formative years in the bush away from their parents.

The second study, currently in progress, involves interviews and focus groups and a 'photovoice' project with male and female former RUF child soldiers. This involves giving the research subjects a camera and using photography as both a means of data collection and empowerment. This project focuses on young people in a slum community in Freetown.

What are some of the research challenges in Sierra Leone?

The first is fear, because the stigma associated with being a child soldier is huge. Many of the young people also had physical brands or marks, such as "RUF" marks on their chest, arm, or even face, so that if they left they could always be identified as rebels. They were afraid that those who could identify them as former rebels might take revenge on them, and this did happen in some rural areas. This was another incentive to migrate to the cities. Most of the young people talked about when they had to hide their identities. Small things like a bent finger from a weapon injury had to be concealed.

Deception was also an issue. At the time that the researchers were recruiting former child soldiers into the study, the Truth Commission was taking statements and the Special Court was functioning. There was a huge fear that they would be prosecuted for their role in the war. Publicly, the Prosecutor acknowledged that the Court would not be prosecuting young people, although it had the power to prosecute those 15 or older.

Young people would not readily admit to harming anyone. Some youths, however, exaggerated their roles, boasting about their prowess killing people. An ongoing theme in this discussion has been the emphasis on child soldiers as victims. This is tied to getting aid and assistance. A white woman is automatically identified as a potential donor, so there is an incentive to diminish your role in violence and emphasise your role as a victim in order to maximize your benefit.

Understanding power relations are really critical in doing work with young people. Power had a complex meaning for child soldiers. They had been marginalized before the war, took on powerful roles during the war as leaders or commanders, and then seemed to lose their power afterwards in the context of demobilization.

There are ethical challenges in dealing with war affected populations in general, and children especially.

How to counterbalance these challenges? The main approach was participatory method, involving the youth as researchers in the project. Twelve former childe soldiers were trained as interviewers, and recruited other young people as participants in the study, collected data, held focus groups, and were

involved in analysis of the data and dissemination of the findings. The data collected by the young people was far better than that collected by the adult research team. When Sierra Leonean adults approached youth, they often refused, but when the youth approached them, they were much more open. During focus groups, the young people's peers served to increase the accuracy of the accounts. Trust was better amongst youth. Young people who had been leaders during the war saw the research as a new leadership opportunity.

Time is critical. It takes time to build trust. Over time, young people began to 'hang out' at the offices of the NGO partner, and even continued to frequent the NGO office after the project was over, and friendships began to develop during that process.

Partnerships were important. The researcher worked with a small local NGO which had culturally sensitive access, cultural expertise, and a better ability to follow youth over time and get corroboration for stories. Corroborating stories over time relied on communities, religious leaders, and families over time. These individuals became key to providing support to young people over time.

The researcher has status as an outsider. Sometimes this makes things harder, but it can also be a benefit, when locals feel that the outsider does not have an agenda, and they will reveal things that they would not reveal to the local partners. At other times, the Sierra Leonean partners would pull back from asking questions.

The strength of using child soldiers as participants in the research is that they are implicated in a pro-social activity, which gets beyond the simplistic dichotomy of victim-aggressor, and contributes to their reintegration in society.

1.2.4 Questions and Discussion on Ethnographic Methods

The discussion involved 13 government officials, 12 military personnel, 11 professors, seven anthropologists, five economists, five students, three organizational and behavioural scientists, three private sector professionals, two police officers, and two public opinion professionals. Some of the main themes in the first discussion period included the trade-off between finding the truth and building trust, strategies for overcoming barriers to research (including security problems and power relationships), the problem of informed consent, and access to (and use of) data collected in fieldwork.

What was the size and composition of the combat ethnography teams? The size and composition of the combat ethnography teams depends on circumstances. Conceptually, it goes back to special operations four-person teams, with two ethnographers and two Special Forces soldiers for personal protection. The teams are not necessarily deployed, but may get orders to do so. Normally they work in anticipation of a conflict, doing research at a distance in collaboration with USAID and the State Department, to train their officers to do what we do. The emphasis is on inter-agency operations. There were only five combat ethnographers, and two have recently died in Afghanistan. So the emphasis is on developing a wider network of expertise.

How did the researchers approach ethics reviews? University research ethics boards (REBs) can be a challenge for research in post-conflict environments, depending on their composition and the experience of their members. The proposal of one researcher went through nine drafts, partly because members of the REB did not understand the research, and did not make much of an effort to read into the difficulties the research question presented. At another university, the REB was not a major hurdle. Parental consent for child soldier interviews could not be obtained, so alternative formulations were deemed acceptable. When individuals could not or would not sign consent forms, verbal consent and the act of participation

was deemed to indicate sufficient consent. The researcher attested to providing information and incentives that were approved by the REB. In the case of combat ethnography, classification level and operational requirements meant that the initial fieldwork in 2007 did not go through a research ethics review. The need for ethics procedures tailored to difficult field research is being addressed by the Field Research and Ethics online resource, under development by the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies of the City University of New York.

One researcher found that reading all the existing research on the area, and then re-reading it after the fieldwork helped to identify research gaps, which the fieldwork had helped to fill. Another said that nothing short of living in the theatre can prepare a researcher adequately, but that knowing and understanding the cultural and historical context is an important part of in-field learning.

Is there work ongoing with Afghan researchers, either in Afghanistan, or involving the diaspora community, to take advantage of the linguistic and cultural skills? Yes, the Office of Naval Research is exploring a research partnership with the University of Kabul. However, there is some reluctance to use foreign nationals who have spent a lot of time outside the country. Often there is a political agenda with "class 2" interpreters (Afghans with US citizenship) and sometimes the Afghan who is not an American citizen is treated as a lower class of partner. Another respondent suggested that locals sometimes do not trust expatriates as translators or research partners, or trust them less than they might trust actual foreigners.

Max Weber famously said, "only outsiders can understand." Did you find that you understood things better than the locals? One respondent suggested that the more you know, the more you realize how little you understand, so maybe Max Weber didn't know enough to realize how little he understood?

1.3 Financial and Economic Analysis

Three presenters addressed different aspects of economic tools to understand non-permissive environments. Here the emphasis is on deceptive and manipulative environments rather than hostile and dangerous ones.

The first speaker demonstrated the utility of management accounting tools for shedding light on the behaviour and constraints upon companies and states, using tools like Standard and Poor's ratings. Legislated penalties and standards help to ensure that the quality of information from such rating agencies is relatively high.

The second speaker described the role of financial intelligence units in general, and FINTRAC's contribution to the Terrorist Resourcing Model in particular. Financial intelligence has both a strategic function (developing new tools and tracking changing patterns of illegal transaction) and a tactical function (supporting specific prosecutions with information about financial transactions).

Drawing on examples from the protracted social conflict in the Niger Delta, the third speaker illustrated the use of open-source news media to map social networks and violence in a remote and non-permissive theatre. Mainstream print newspapers, supplemented by human rights (Human Rights Watch) and political assessment NGOs (International Crisis Group) can provide tools such as a chronological listing of events, a list of key players and related organizations and events, and major issues in the conflict as it evolves over time.

These three forms of research take place outside a hostile or dangerous environment, but provide essential context for the qualitative and ethnographic methods presented in the first panel. For example, an ethnographer or police investigator working in West Africa would benefit from a summary of the historical and contemporary actors, organizations and issues (third speaker), a sovereign rating of the country in question (first speaker), and financial intelligence about the major players (second speaker). Companies and actors identified by the sort of survey conducted by the third speaker would be useful pointers for the sort of targeted analysis possible in financial intelligence units.

1.3.1 CMA Tools For Understanding Networks and "Economic Jihadism"

Certified Management Accountants (CMAs) have professional obligations and are trained in the use of financial and economic tools that have applications for research about non-permissive environments, although probably not *in* non-permissive environments.

A CMA working for the federal government presented on three aspects of the intelligence applications of CMA expertise: quality of information; critical indicators; and scenarios of interest emerging from an application of economic analysis.

The accounting world has developed sophisticated measures for quality assurance, particularly the assessment of fraud affecting investor confidence. This is really about understanding motivations and deception, and so it has implications for intelligence analysis. There are four key questions for an analyst looking for fraud, which are important for understanding motivations. Is there a sense of entitlement? Are there weak controls in place? Can an actor get away with transgressions? And finally, what are the consequences of inaction in the face of these risks? If the answers to the first two questions are yes, then there is a potential problem. Financial information can be used to assess companies or states, resulting in an opinion supported by qualitative and quantitative evidence.

Audit quality information provides the best results. For example, Standard and Poor's process and Security Exchange Commission submissions require honest reporting and substantiated judgement, or the analyst faces stiff fines and jail time, as evidenced by the statement required of CEOs.

> "I have reviewed this annual report…Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made…not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included in this report…The penalty for false or misleading statements is $10 million in personal fines and/or 20 years in Federal Penitentiary." (Capstone analysis of Exxon Corporation, 2005)

This is a higher standard of evidence than is typically available to academic researchers. Reading the legislative Acts that support international economic transactions, and following the consequences of violation reinforces confidence in reporting. BAE Systems, for example, has been charged under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for bribery in Tanzania and Saudi Arabia. Accountants now have to sign off on non-financial information as a faithful representation of the truth. The fact that this signature means something to an external regulatory body is important for reliability and validity of information.

The Standard and Poor's process is important to understand, because it is regulated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and provides a template for assessing both companies and states. Can countries pay their debts? Are they reliable partners? Sovereign ratings include social, economic, and

political indicators, which can provide useful insights into motivations and factors influencing national decision-making.[6]

The corporate rating process applies the same model used by auditors and strategic business analysts alike, and includes an assessment of business and financial risk factors. Within the business risk factors, for example, we consider market position, diversification, operating efficiency, management growth and operating strategy, and ownership and governance. Financial risk scores are derived from factors like accounting procedures, governance policies, cash flow adequacy, capital structure and asset protection, and liquidity.

When we understand and apply both corporate and sovereign ratings, we can arrive at useful conclusions about the stability and vulnerability of major industries and states. For example, we may want to check the corporate ratings of major players in the defence industry, either for contracting purposes, or because they are national strategic assets. When we look at Standard and Poor's sovereign ratings, we find that they reflect national stability more accurately than the publicly available *CIA World Factbook*, because they must be updated regularly for commercial purposes.

Capstone analysis of states, corporations and specific markets can help to flag conditions for national security concern. This brings us back to the questions traditionally asked by accountants looking for fraud and deception. Is there a strong sense of entitlement? Are controls weak? Can groups or individuals get away with malfeasance? What would be the consequences of inaction for Canadian assets or national security? A sense of entitlement—whether it is political, cultural/religious, economic, or social—provides the justification for action.

Inadequate controls attract economic warfare, as we have seen in weak and failed states, where there are large gaps between rich and poor. Low quality national and business governance standards are recipes for money laundering, corporate malfeasance, and organized crime. Ineffective coordination on public safety can increase a society's vulnerability.[7]

National security analysts should not underestimate the impact of market collusion for profit, and the economic consequences of overt physical asset impairment through financial transactions or cyber attack. Hedge funds, for example can move large amounts of money quickly and easily. Derivatives are a $300 trillion operation in a global economy of $70 trillion, so that's clearly a potential problem. Market collusion in commodities can have big national security consequences.

Consider a major corporation involved in strategically significant transport, facing a hostile take-over from an investment company which uses disinformation and propaganda to deceive investors, and leverage its position to strip assets and destroy the ability of the company to continue its operations. The motivations may be sociopathic greed, but the implications are clearly strategic. Canada is committed to free markets, but there are plenty of companies, assets, and resources that could be seized or manipulated through markets in ways that would affect national security. Economic analysis by CMAs can help track these risks and assess the motivations and behaviour of economic actors that may be inimical to national security.

[6] Since the 2009 financial crisis, there has been some discussion about the role of private rating agencies and government oversight. See Kathleen Casey and Frank Partnoy, (a Commissioner of the SEC and a law professor writing about financial markets, Op-Ed contributors), "Downgrade the Ratings Agencies," New York Times, 4 June 2010.

[7] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Executive Summary, *Emergency Preparedness in Canada: How the fine arts of bafflegab and procrastination hobble the people who will be trying to save you when things get really bad…* http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/press-e/02sep08a-e.htm

1.3.2 Financial Analysis Tools in Support of Counter-Terrorism

FINTRAC is the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada. Financial intelligence is a relatively recent development, with Australia launching one of the first financial intelligence units, AUSTRAC, in 1988, and the US following with FinCEN in 1990. This presentation focused on the role and tools of financial intelligence, in particular FINTRAC's contributions to the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) terrorist resourcing model.

Financial intelligence is derived from an analysis of financial transactions by entities of interest, in order to shed light on their nature and capabilities. This can then be used for intelligence purposes, or to take action, perhaps to disrupt a network through police action and prosecution.

Financial intelligence units help to detect, prevent, and deter money laundering, terrorist financing, and other security threats. Information is gathered through mandated regulatory reporting from banks and financial institutions. When money is shuffled quickly from one institution to another, for example, this may raise concerns and trigger investigations. FINTRAC receives mandated reports, ensures compliance with the legislation, and works with other security intelligence organizations like CSIS, CSE, CBSA, and CRA. The disseminate strategic intelligence about changing patterns of financial transactions to these organizations, and also serve a public education function to raise awareness about what and how to report.

FINTRAC gets specific reports about suspicious transactions and attempted transactions. For example, a bank client might attempt to deposit a bag full of cash, and walk away upon being informed of the reporting requirement. Any international transfer of more than $10 thousand, and any seizure of funds at a border must be reported. A new innovation is reporting of casino disbursements.

In addition to mandated reporting by financial institutions, banks, and credit unions, relevant financial information is volunteered by police, CSIS, and sometimes the general public. Money wire services like Western Union and even informal transfer mechanisms like Hawala banking are all required to report transfers. Financial intelligence spends a lot of time trying to understand gaps in reporting, which may arise from missing institutions, or from new technology, new payment systems, and how they change the financial landscape.

There is an underlying assumption that all this information will help to generate insights about criminal activities – how money moves, how criminal purchases and sales are made outside the formal economy. Police might want to use this information to link targets in a criminal investigation. At another level, we might be concerned with a rogue nation or failed state – are its financial transactions changing in ways that affect Canadian interests? Or we might look at a particular group. How does it behave – where does its money come from and go to? Who is it connected to?

The Terrorist Resourcing Model was developed by the ITAC. It is more useful for anti-terrorism than the money laundering model of the Global Finance Forum (GFF) because the money laundering model is focused on the money itself, and is concerned mainly about distancing and disguising the sources of funds than about how entities obtained and intend to use the funds.[8]

The Terrorist Resourcing Model postulates five stages. First, funds are acquired by a variety of means. Second, they are aggregated from multiple sources. Third, they are transmitted to a terrorist organization.

[8] As an aside, the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) of the UK has been working with the Global Finance Forum to develop other tools to address international criminal transfers and criminal markets. This helps shed light on research on non-permissive criminal environments, but is beyond the scope of this presentation. See SOCA, "Itinerant Loner was mastermind behind global criminal market place," 14 January 2010, http://www.soca.gov.uk/news/164-itinerant-loner-was-mastermind-behind-global-criminal-marketplace

Fourth, the organization passes them on to a cell, and finally, the cell converts the funds into materials or support for an operation. This is a conceptual model, and all five may not necessarily be evident in a particular case. The model helps to identify what information would be useful to map out financial support in a non-permissive environment. Who is supporting the group? Do funds come from a diaspora, a state sponsor, from criminal activity? How big is support for the group? How frequent are the transfers, and where do they come from and go to? When funds are exchanged for end-use goods and services, what are they buying, and where is the support? Where do each of these stages take place, what is the velocity with which funds move, and what types of people are involved in the transactions?

What does the inclusion or omission of a stage in the process tell us about the structure and parts of an organization? When we look closely at what is being bought, maybe the funds focus on support – building schools or clinics, or financial support for suicide bombers' families.

A financial intelligence unit would be part of a team that tries to assess these patterns, in cooperation with other intelligence services, which have different types of information. Financial intelligence is a new and developing tool, complementary to human and signals intelligence, and other means of assessing threats.

1.3.3 Data Collection and Evaluation From Open Sources

It is not always possible, or perhaps necessary, to travel into non-permissive environments in order to begin to describe their social and economic dynamics. This presentation was solicited in order to explore the limits of open-source searches using major news media.

The delta of the Niger River in Nigeria is a major source of oil exports, and has been economically important to the West since the colonial era in the 1890s. It is socially complex and has been subject to successive waves of violence, making it a difficult area to research. Nigeria is now considered an important trans-shipment point for drugs moving between Latin America, Europe, and North America, and the chaotic environment enables organized crime to flourish.

The presentation began with a description of the latest round of violence. Armed gangs had recently kidnapped executives from an oil platform in the Niger Delta. Nigerian oil production was reduced by 10 percent. Various demands by the gangs included compensation in accordance with a Nigerian court judgement, and there were threats to continue attacks on the oil platforms. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was making claims to speak for the Ijaw people. As in other protracted social conflicts, it is difficult to disentangle the players and agendas, and to identify the key actors.

Human Rights Watch describes this situation as a low intensity conflict, characterized by monumental fraud. Cults, gangs, secret university and community organizations with armed 'street' wings are influential players.

The aim of this research was to use open source information to map the relationships between these complex factions, using daily newspapers and the reports of human rights NGOs. Using the search engine Ebscohost on sources from 1859 to 2008, more than 1000 articles from 75 primarily Western newspapers were searched and summarized to map the interactions of the main players in the Niger Delta. This is not an exhaustive search, nor does it constitute 'events data'. It does not include many African or other non-Western sources that would give a different picture. Nor was there a large representation of specific financial reports, although the financial sections of mainstream newspapers are well represented in the data.

Each article was read with the aim of listing individuals and organizations. Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, and Small Arms Survey were the main NGO sources used to augment the newspaper sources.

This approach to open source material allowed the presenter to describe some of the patterns of violence and political action that have characterized the Niger Delta region over the last two decades. The names of individual leaders, rival gangs, and political parties can be mapped as a necessary precursor to in-theatre study or social network analysis. The frequently changing names, shifting alliances and rearrangement of organizations with names like "Icelanders," "Germans," "Niger Delta Vigilante Service," and political parties like the People's Democratic Party are difficult to understand without some form of play-book or index, which can be developed from open sources.

Open source analysis also helps highlight the major issues in the conflict. Oil bunkering, or the theft of oil from pipelines, has become the major economic activity, with gang control of access and distribution being secondary economic activities. Since the price of oil rises with kidnappings, there is an incentive to attack oil production to drive the price up.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of open source information? Newspapers provide a framework of verifiable factual information. Human rights organizations and NGOs like the International Crisis Group and Small Arms Survey provide better relational information: who is connected to who? Both newspapers and NGO reports rely on local contacts. With international newspapers, there is some protection and organization, including the ability to flee, that locals do not have when investigating protracted social conflicts. Neither diplomats nor defence attachés typically remain in theatre as long as reporters and their indigenous local contacts. The chief advantage is accessibility and reliability, and the option of electronic searches on large bodies of text, using qualitative tools like NVIVO.

Some of the problems with open source material are common to other forms of information gathering. Interview subjects can lie or mislead, and organizations can co-opt or intimidate reporters. Understanding the importance of propaganda in the West, they shape their messages accordingly. For example, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogone People has adopted the language of environmentalism and democracy, and supports its own web site and fund-raising effort in the West.[9]

Despite these shortcomings, thousands of text sources covering a period of decades or even a century or more can provide a more consistent narrative backdrop than can a few score interviews conducted by an outsider in theatre over a period of months. For a few thousand dollars of graduate student time, a detailed searchable database of names, places, organizations, and events can be compiled without ever going into a conflict zone. This can then be part of preparation package for specialists doing more detailed work in theatre.

1.3.4 Questions and Discussion about Economic Analysis

Questions and discussion began to probe the problem of research to support prosecution, and several questions had policy implications.

Question: Each of these analytical techniques suggests some sort of prediction. How do these techniques help analysts to identify 'false positives' – things that appear to be problematic, but turn out not to be. What are the responsibilities of the analyst? Do we impose long-term consequences on innocent bystanders because of our assumptions about the way financial transactions *should* work?

[9] MOSOP, "Movement for the Survival of the Ogone People," http://www.mosop.org/

Accountants use a concept, "red flag". This doesn't mean that an event has occurred, but that the conditions permitting the event are present. This should permit law enforcement officials to examine the circumstances, with all due legal protections, to see whether the red flag indicates that something illegal has actually occurred. Knowing this would help to control the number of red flag incidents that might occur. There is another problem. The Canada-US border is largely eliminated by the Free Trade Agreement, so if we don't do due diligence on financial transactions in Canada, and an incident in Canada results in major losses in the US (for example, a major power failure) then Canada or Canadians could be sued in an American court with national financial or infrastructure consequences. Consider for example, that both the American and Canadian Supreme Courts have ruled in favour of litigants making claims in the other country. This illustrates that we may have to run the risk of a false positive in order to avoid the consequences of failure.

But how are 'red flags' removed? There is an OECD list of tax havens, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering (www.fatf-gafi.org) provides a list of non-cooperating countries and territories. Some countries go on and off these lists repeatedly, but there is no world court to try a country, so analysts and investigators have to be aware of changing circumstances that affect risks and the probability that a transaction is criminal.

False positives cannot be taken lightly. Investigative agencies are audited by the Privacy Commissioner, and held to account by Parliament, so they have to take very seriously the rights of individuals and companies that are investigated.

Question: We are focused on the global economic system as we know it, but the world economy is changing. How do we analyse problems like the emerging system of Islamic banking, when we in the West are essentially outsiders?

There are actually two issues here. The first is that there are non-Western rule sets in international finance which are becoming more important. Standard and Poor's has a rating system for Islamic financial systems. It takes some work to understand it. But secondly, there are lots of other means of getting around the current system of financial regulations. For example, the derivative market is huge, poorly understood, and poorly regulated. It has a lot of potential for wreaking economic havoc. How can the derivatives market by worth many times the value of the assets that underpin it? Maybe there is something else going on here that is going to affect our economic security. Islamic finance is a rising force in the international economy, but it does follow rules.

Financial intelligence units are looking at informal transactions, Islamic banking, Hawala banking, and other informal networks. Analysts have to work out how to get the reports that they need in a respectful and collaborative way. It is essential to solicit the cooperation of institutions that provide the information.

Question: how might we measure the 'return on investment' from an intervention, in order to target our interventions more effectively? We know, for example, that some of the money we are spending in Afghanistan, (for example to pay for transport of supplies brought in from Pakistan) is finding its way into the wrong hands, and supporting our enemies. How can we use these methods to assess whether an intervening power, or an assisted country, is getting the return it should be getting from the cost of an intervention? Can we be more agile and sophisticated in the way that we spend funds in a conflict zone?

International development tends to be a top down process. The World Bank and IMF tend to sponsor large projects, when micro development and Grameen banks (www.grameen-info.org) may be much more effective. For example, in the Niger Delta most financial transactions tend to be corrupt, and anti-corruption activities simply crack down on the corruption that does not line the pockets of the politicians responsible for enforcement. When major extraction multinationals expanded into former colonies after

the Second World War, they dealt with governments strictly as resource extraction operations, and helped to create the current generation of economic and social problems. What we should have learned is that resource extraction investments have enormous economic power, and if they are managed as development programs rather than looting operations, they are less likely to create the sort of conflicts that later have to be cleaned up. Military interventions also deploy huge resources, and might usefully be thought of as development projects. Regulation and oversight are ways of managing these unintended costs.

1.4 Policing Tools

1.4.1 Sources and Methods to Support Security Analysis

A security intelligence service that spoke publicly about its sources and methods would not be a very good service. However there are two issues that can be usefully addressed by a speaker with that background. The first concerns sources in general and how they are used. The second concerns the relationship between security analysts and academics in dealing with terrorism.

Two of the major sources of security intelligence analysis are the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Analysis for these organizations can be an all-consuming passion, involving multilingual communications analysts in long hours over careers spanning decades. This can be the best job in the world for an "information junkie" – with access to every classified and unclassified source, human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), intelligence from allied sources and special sharing arrangements. But dwarfing all these sources, there is a huge array of open-source materials. A good security intelligence service relies heavily on superb librarians.

As an analyst, the speaker was paid to understand Islamic extremism and radicalization, to make sense of open source and classified material, and provide cogent advice to senior levels of government. After it has gone through the agency process, it is not a personal view, but the view of the service. Good analysis is only built on good information, and a lot of this must be from open sources.

Classified intelligence is "sexy" and there is a sense in some circles that if there is a high security classification on a piece of information, then it must be true. But this was not the experience of the speaker. Having worked both signals and human intelligence sources, the speaker opined that human intelligence was often more reliable.

In order to advise government about what is going on and what to do about it, the best way to work is at the lowest classification possible. The unfortunate reality is that the higher the classification, the lower the audience. In some jobs, without exaggeration, material was classified at such a high level that the audience might be reduced to as few as three people in the government of Canada. They may be very important people, but very high classification levels reduce the impact of analysis. It is better to work by marrying the best of the open source information with the best information from classified intelligence sources. Not everything that comes in is useful; analysts have to discern what parts of it make a contribution.

An example illustrates how open and classified sources are combined. It has been in the news recently there are concerns about Canadian citizens travelling abroad to engage in terrorist training, or to hook up with terrorist groups. The most recent example was a group of Somali teenagers leaving the Toronto area to join Al-Shabab, a group recently added to Canada's list of banned terrorist groups. This could be tracked by looking at border crossings, travel plans, speaking to government officials, all in the unclassified realm. However, there is a piece of that puzzle that is not in the public domain, which you

will not read in the Toronto Star, or Globe and Mail. That is the intelligence picture. So for an analyst to paint the picture to government officials who may already by partly aware of events from the news, the best approach is to set the stage with open source material, explain the experience of other countries, from whom we might have privileged information, and then add the unique Canadian experience, drawing on classified sources that can flesh out the details and identify specifically Canadian risks and concerns. That is the value added of a security intelligence service.

One of the maxim's of intelligence work is that if the same intelligence is available from several sources, cite the lowest classification, for the widest distribution. Well over half of a typical analysts work is open sources, from journals, online sites, think tanks, scholarly works, refereed articles, and so on. To be an effective analyst, you have to master your field, and that means keeping up on it. You can't decide on a day's notice to be an expert on a subject; to be an expert requires reading thousands of documents and understanding their connections. It is a daily duty to keep up on what is available, understand them, and extract the best information. This is a shift from the Cold War. Back then, analysts were told that their job was analyse intelligence, not what was in the open domain. Times have changed. The CSIS library now is probably the best in the government of Canada.

Advice is not the same as intelligence. Analysts provide advice based on the best information available, contextualized, and combined with intelligence. The problem is that policy makers and politicians are not necessarily well informed, they move around government and maybe good generalists, but don't have the depth of knowledge that analysts are expected to have. The intelligence analysts must have the expertise and insight to keep them informed and to give good advice.

The second point to address is the relationship between analysts and academics. About a year ago, CSIS created a branch called Academic Outreach. This is not a secret. Its aim is to reach out to academics and create a dialogue with people who have useful expertise so that they can be brought into CSIS in a non-classified way. They do not need security classification. They provide knowledge and understanding that we would otherwise lack. Through the academic outreach branch, CSIS has sponsored a number of conferences over the last 18 months on areas such as Pakistan, Iran, China, radicalization, inviting some of the top experts the field. We acknowledge that this is a one-way relationship; CSIS is taking this expertise, and not offering anything up in return (except funding). There is no opportunity for academics to learn how the analysis process works, or gain access to intelligence. This is very beneficial for the Service, and academics keep signing up, so they must get something out of it.

There is room to improve the academic-intelligence relationship. Working in intelligence, one does not expect to read stories in the open media that celebrate intelligence successes; failures are public, but successes are invisible. The Toronto 18 arrests were at first portrayed as a complete failure, but is now being hailed as a success, as one after another the indicted individuals are pleading guilty and going to jail. Nevertheless, it is disappointing to see some opinions and analysis written up by academics who should know better.

A Canada Research Chair at the University of Ottawa, Amir Attaran, wrote an opinion piece for the National Post criticising CSIS for accepting torture as a response to terrorism.[10] The misrepresentations were so egregious that in an unusual move, Richard Fadden, Director of CSIS, responded to the National Post to set the record straight.[11] Another widely cited professor argued that CSIS is involved in accepting information obtained through torture from the NDS. Again, the author should have known better. It is

[10] Amir Attaran, "Terrorism Isn't Special," *National Post*, Full Comment Section, 19 February, 2010. http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2010/02/19/amir-attaran-terrorism-isn-t-special.aspx

[11] *National Post*, Letter-to-the-Editor by Director Richard B. Fadden, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/cmmn/dr_ntpst_lttr-eng.asp 15 March 2010.

frustrating, and we are fortunate that the current Director is prepared to respond. A last example of sloppy academic work is an article entitled, "Anti-Terror Lessons of the Muslim Americans".[12] Schanzer, Kurzman and Moosa, three well-known academics writing on terrorism and radicalization are amongst some who deny the existence of the phenomenon of radicalization in the US. These well-regarded academics write definitively that since 9-11, 139 people, in total, have been "radicalized" in the United States. It's a very precise figure, but a rather bizarre definition of radicalization: those who have been charged with acts of terrorism. My point is that a study like this does not contribute to a dialogue, and speaks to the larger issue of the way academics and security intelligence analysts frame their findings.

A good analyst is never definitive. We deal in probabilities, propensities, possibilities, based on patterns, and information that we always recognize as incomplete. We know that we don't have all the facts. "Connecting the dots" is not a good analogy for intelligence analysis. What concerns me about some of the academic studies is the illusion of precision. Out of 350 million people, only 139 have been radicalized. This frame suggests that it is not a problem, it does not merit resources. This is bad analysis, and risks misleading public policy.

The dialogue between academics and security intelligence analysts must continue, but on the basis of mutual respect and understanding. We have to get away from accusations of incompetence and assumptions of bad ethics in the security services. Security intelligence services are working hard to build good relations with academics. We don't expect much from the media, but we do hope that academics will check their facts and take a balanced approach that recognizes none of us is in possession of all the facts. It is time for the debate about national security in Canada to get serious, and to stop being a mud-slinging match.

1.4.2 Proceeds of Crime and Investigative Techniques

The second speaker had served 30 years with a major police service, including 20 years working on proceeds of crime, frequently serving as an expert witness. The presentation will address three issues: the investigative tools used in proceeds of crime, the standards of evidence, and the specific tool of tracing currency serial numbers.

There are seven general investigative avenues used by police to identify or seize the proceeds of crime. These are: statements by witnesses and suspects; electronic and physical surveillance; informants and undercover operations; search and seizure (with or without a warrant); forensic analysis; accounting (cash flow and net worth analysis); database queries through domestic or foreign police services, with the associated police-to-police cooperative arrangements, and use of financial records.

The speaker addressed some of the challenges associated with these investigative avenues in the context of Canadian police work.

Canadian law enforcement operates under the scrutiny of the courts and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and this can make it very difficult to gather evidence. Our country protects and defends privacy vigorously. This can make it very difficult for the state—that means the police—to gather evidence. For example, the Charter affects search and seizure. Any time the police seizes evidence without judicial authorization it is deemed inherently unreasonable, and it is up to the Crown to prove in a

[12] David Schanzer , Charles Kurzman, Ebrahim Moosa, "Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans," Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, 6 January 2010, supported by grant no. 2007-IJ-CX-0008, awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. http://www.sanford.duke.edu/news/Schanzer_Kurzman_Moosa_Anti-Terror_Lessons.pdf

court of law that the seizure was authorized in law, that the search was conducted reasonably, and that the law was observed. If the rules are not followed, courts exclude the evidence.

In British and Canadian legal history, confessions have always been considered highly suspect. To get a statement in court, the prosecution has to go through a *voir-dire*, full disclosure. We try to determine whether witness statements are reliable. If a police officer takes a statement, an accused has to be advised of the right to remain silent, call a lawyer, and so on. A good investigator will encourage a witness to call their lawyer. It can provide a tactical advantage in gathering information, because in the proceeds of crime business, we have usually seized a bunch of cash or assets. Thinking that they are dealing with stupid cops, suspects will often tell a story, on videotape, with their lawyer. The hallmark of these stories is usually evasiveness. A legitimate transaction has clarity, and when transactions lack this clarity, that is a red flag that we can follow up.

Investigators can follow up with electronic surveillance authorized by court orders, but there are fairly stringent rules to get these authorizations. Informants are another important tool for investigators. The credibility of informants is often questioned in a court of law, so the onus is on the investigator to corroborate the informant's story with other sources. This means getting judicial authorization for wiretaps and electronic surveillance to help demonstrate that the informant is telling the truth.

Search and seizure can be problematic. Whenever anything is seized without warrant, the prosecution must demonstrate that the seizure was justified, or the evidence will be thrown out. There have been some successful targeting programs, where police intelligence has helped to identify pipeline or jetway smuggling profiles. Last minute boarding, payment in cash, nervousness, and confusing information about itinerary are some of the profile signals for smuggling.

Forensic analysis typically involves fingerprinting, but can also involve chemical tracking of cash that has been in contact with drug chemicals, of which more will be said.

Accounting is a major tool for proceeds of crime investigations. This includes both analysis of cash flow and net worth. Where does the money come from? How does a suspect afford an extravagant lifestyle or major investments? We look at land titles, property, commercial holdings, bank statements, corporation documents and so on. One of the problems with incorporation documents is that each province has its own system, and quite often the documents will list officers of the corporation, but this does not prove ownership.

Data base queries are increasingly important. We use Canadian and foreign police services through police-to-police assistance, formal assistance, "Letters Rogatory" and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Applications. A letter rogatory, or letter of request, is simply a formal request for assistance from a court in one country to a court in another for some form of judicial assistance. Because of privacy issues, various levels and departments of government do not share information well. Tax records can only be released with superior court orders. Many other forms of tax and government information are simply not obtainable by court order, unless charges are laid, or there is written consent by the individual. Police must apply to obtain immigration and passport information to support an investigation, and the minister has the right to refuse.

Investigators also get information from financial intelligence units such as FINTRAC. FINTRAC information is very useful. They can do data queries on a very large and sophisticated database, and they can pull all the various platforms together. While a police investigator would have to go separately to each bank and financial institution, FINTRAC can pull all the platforms together—cross-border transactions, suspicious transactions, and large cash transactions, for example. This can lead to other countries, banks in tax havens and so on.

Since the purpose of these investigations is to get a conviction, investigators have to keep in mind levels of proof, and how they affect proceeds of crime investigations.

There are four levels of evidentiary proof in Canadian legal proceedings that can affect seizure and the forfeiture of seized funds.

The lowest level of proof is "reasonable suspicion" or articulable cause. The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and the Cross Border Currency Regulations allow a Customs officer to seize the equivalent of $10,000 in currency or monetary instruments that have not been declared crossing Canada's borders, if the officer is able to articulate a reasonable suspicion that the funds are the proceeds of crime. If the officer is unable to provide the basis for suspicion, the funds are released. These seizures are reported to FINTRAC. By law, the CBSA is not permitted to advise the police of such seizures, but is required to report it to FINTRAC.

The next level, "reasonable and probably grounds" is the basis for police to swear a charge, to obtain a search warrant, court order, restraint order, and so on. This requires more compelling evidence than just a reasonably based suspicion.

The next level is balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence. This is sometimes described as "fifty percent plus a smidge" and it means that in a civil suit, parties have to provide each other with their evidence in "discovery". Some provincial legislatures have enacted civil remedies acts so that they can free up the proceeds of criminal activities to offset the harm done to victims or the public. This is based on the rule of "preponderance of evidence".

The problem is that the police officer can detain a suspect and make life difficult on the strength of little more than a suspicion, and courts may seize funds and hand them out to members of the public on the strength of evidence that is barely over fifty percent. So there is a fear in courts that there may be insufficient protections. The basis of police work therefore becomes "compelling evidence" rather than the lower standard of reasonable suspicion. The court may reasonably acquit if the initial actions are not based on compelling evidence.

This is why it is extremely difficult for proceeds of crime cases to be successful. A single fact can be enough to cast doubt on the investigation, so between investigation and prosecution, the case must presented as very close to absolute certainty; anything less is unlikely to result in a successful conviction, and this is at the end of the process. First, there is the barrier of compelling evidence to start the process; then there is less than a fifty percent chance that the investigation will be successful, and finally if it does go to trial, there is less than a fifty percent conviction rate.

Tracing currency by serial numbers is a specific tool that is sometimes misunderstood. Although notes are serialized, people do not keep track of funds by serial number when they buy or sell. The Bank of Canada tracks large numbers of sequential bills going to major financial institutions, but the trace is lost after that, and banks do not track serial numbers that go to their branches. The US Federal Reserve requires that funds be traced to banks, but not to branches. When money goes out onto the street, it becomes virtually untraceable. However, there are some tools.

The Currency Reading and Tracing System (CRATS) is software that has been available since the early 1990s, developed by RCMP technicians, to scan and record the serial numbers of Canadian and American currency. Currency used by undercover police to make criminal purchases of contraband are recorded. Funds that are subsequently seized in other investigations are then scanned and compared to the database to determine if there are linkages to previous investigations. There are often hits on small numbers of notes, but because these are small numbers and non-sequential bills, even positive hits do not result in

successful prosecutions without other evidence, but they may provide evidence of connections to specific organized crime groups.

1.4.3 Combined Forces Special Enforcement Units

A third speaker on police investigative techniques was unable to attend the workshop, but provided a paper on Combined Forces Special Enforcement Units. This expert has served in British and Canadian Special Forces units, and now brings those skills to police operations against organized crime. What follows are comments on the paper rather than notes from a presentation.

The paper addresses the origin and evolution of police special operations, particularly as applied to rural areas. The characteristics of special operations indicate that collection techniques are relevant to the problem of social research methods in non-permissive environments. Covert police special operations tend to be high risk, and offer the prospect of high returns. They are subordinate to and supportive of the investigative effort, conducted within strict legal parameters to preserve evidence and withstand court scrutiny, and controlled at the highest command level.

Several aspects of police special operations bear close examination as paradigms for research in non-permissive environments, where rule of law may or may not obtain.

First, the units built up to execute police special operations (or special operations law enforcement) become a valuable resource in high demand, with 60 percent of their deployments executed in support of other government departments. Second, many basic tools of special operations—infiltration, concealment, reconnaissance, and long-range communications—can be applied within a legal framework to collect evidence that can be used in a Canadian court of law. This suggests that they can also support building rule of law on expeditionary operations, or preparing for adversary influence operations. Third, many of the personal qualities necessary for good police special operations are the same as those required for military special operations. It was noted in the first panel that these qualities are important to support field ethnography as part of the research process. Finally, conduct of these operations is the culmination of a long process of training, planning, and preparation, without which an operation would not be successful. This, of course, is why such units become valuable resources in high demand by other government departments.

The author's discussion of rural surveillance operations planning closely parallels planning of long-range patrols and extended observation in combat operations. In addition, however, overt observation posts can be sited visibly for deterrence, and there are many circumstances in peacekeeping and stabilization operations that may call for this.

Implicit in the concept of police special operations is the framework of law that requires preservation of evidence, non-use of force except in self-defence, and resort to the courts to impose punishment for illegal activities. This is where the restrictions and difficulties facing prosecutions become particularly germane. There is a clear difference between the framework of law in Canada, (which provides extensive protections for privacy and the rights of the accused) and Afghanistan, (in which combat operations are comparatively unrestricted by rule of law). Nevertheless, the convergence of police and military techniques for dealing with terrorism and organized crime suggest important overlap on social research methods, and in police and combat intelligence gathering.

1.4.4 Questions and Discussion

There are several connections between this discussion of police investigative techniques and the constraints under which they operate at home and abroad. "Rule of law" is an aspiration in Afghanistan,

but a constraint in Canada, which means that investigative tools can have a limited impact on crime and prevention. The standards applied at home and abroad are different. How can the tools and methods developed for police work at home be applied to operations abroad?

Question: Is there a risk that investigative capabilities will be lost or rendered less effective because they are revealed in court?

The police speaker agreed that this happens all the time. Whenever a capability is disclosed in court, it is only a matter of time before that capability is ineffective, and sometimes it even becomes dangerous to attempt to use it again. We are able to protect the identity of informants, but that is the end of it. When we get a search warrant, we can get a sealing order that prevents immediate disclosure, but when we go to trial, it is all open. Foreign agencies have great difficulty dealing with Canadian police, even CSIS has problems, because police must source their information the minute that they go to court.

The security intelligence speaker agreed. Given the reluctance of security intelligence to be in court, dealings with the police are particularly problematic. Sources cannot be named under intelligence legislation. The court system provides some special protections for CSIS, but not for the police, and so there has to be great caution in the sharing of information that is operationally important.

Question: We know that trust comes from mutual respect and some give and take. If security intelligence is all "take", how might it build its relationship with academics?

The first speaker noted that the relationship is something that has to be built gradually over time. One approach by several services is to make academics into analysts, with all the security clearance and training that that implies. Another example is having lawyers as special applicants, who can access information on behalf of clients and challenge it within the classified appeals process. The initial thrill of being invited into a secret world will not last long if there is nothing in it for the academics.

On the police side, academic material and expertise can make an important contribution to building a case. For example, Ekos research commissioned by a consumer group demonstrated that 99 percent of Canadians use bank machines, and this was important data to counter claims by a defence lawyer that lots of people don't bank in the formal system. We survey World Bank articles, learn about remittance patterns from Canadian-Vietnamese expatriate newspapers, and get a better understanding of formal and informal systems from academic sources.

1.5 Polls and Surveys

Polls and surveys provide a range of the opinions found within a certain group. These research methods are used in open and accessible as well as closed and non-permissive environments. This panel explores how polls and surveys can be used to gauge those in difficult, deceptive circumstances.

There is no single method or process that ought to be used to conduct surveys and polls in non-permissive environments. Each behaviour explained different tactics of varying complexities. The purpose of these accounts is not to create a holistic research manual but to give several glimpses of real-world investigations.

Each behaviour gave different accounts of how research was conducted, in what situation, and for what purpose. The main agreement between the behaviour was, as the last presenter pointed out, surveying and polling in non-permissive situations is simply another vein of traditional research. The linchpin of any human-dependent research is the honesty of the respondent. Those being interviewed must be able to speak freely and frankly. Nothing less is acceptable if the research is to be credible, and this poses

problems when researching in difficult situations or on sensitive subjects.

By extension, each of the behaviour called for additional scrutiny of research in non-permissive environments. Each made mention that the investigations carried out by members of the military in Afghanistan, for instance, fell below academic or professional standards. Field research and the use of polls and surveys in closed environments can not, and should not, be treated as a rouge field of research. Professional scrutiny, careful planning and execution matters.

Understanding the limitations facing researchers is important. Polling and surveying is subject to the paradoxes that are part of the human condition. Universal claims cannot be made from a single data set, and relating information from one poll to another is also suspect. Other variables such as time, security and physical conditions are too often out of the researcher's control.

1.5.1 Data Collection in Support of Human Effects Coordination in Afghanistan

The presenter conducted human effects research in Afghanistan 2009 and primarily addresses this topic based on his own experiences.

In Afghanistan it is difficult for NATO forces to distinguish what exactly has an effect on the surrounding population. The presenter defines 'effects' as "changes at the operational level with the commanders trying to influence change in a complex system." Whether a social, ideological or tactical change, it is deliberate and carefully calculated by the leadership on the ground. Since the operations in Afghanistan are multidimensional and exist on a number of planes, planners must attempt to influence change in a number of places simultaneously – including in politics, economics, security and so forth.

In the presenter's case, his commander wished to separate the insurgency from the population, and subsequently make the insurgency irrelevant to the population. A plan was put in place. But still evaluating the supporting operations' success was far from simple. In his words, "how the heck do you measure when the population is morally separated from the insurgency?"

Their team developed two measures to grade the effectiveness of their actions. The first was 'measures of performance' which was essentially a way to evaluate "how well the effect is being achieved" using both qualitative and quantitative markers. They revolved mostly around behavioural markers gained from building relationships with locals and eventually conducting focus groups. The key to getting quality data was that locals were honest and open with the interviewer, and this proved to be quite difficult. The second evaluation was 'measures of output'. These were notable quantitative changes that would indicate some sort of change. Popular markers included the number of nearby IED attacks and the number of schools that were operational. Linked together, these two 'measures of effectiveness' attempted to gauge broader behaviour of the local population.

The mode of research depended on the situation. Initially direct observation was the most useful way to collect data – especially when the researcher was new in the community. This involved a good deal of interchange between being and active and passive observer. Initially, playing the part of an active observer, the presenter found that Pashtun males were very good at sensing that he was not part of the standard patrol group. They worried that the individual had an agenda and was intimately tied to the leadership of ISAF. It was feared that the data collected was then void. The presenter eventually switched tactics and decided to passively observe the locals and found that he yielded a high quality of data.

Subsequently, the researcher realized that his direct observations could be of use in solving local

unspoken grievances. For example, local Pashtuns spoke positively about a certain school for their children. However, it was noted regularly by ISAF forces that no children were going to the school. By using direct observation, sometimes in an active manner, the researcher was eventually able to discover why no one allowed their kids to attend the school. The researcher then fed the data to the local tactical commander who then developed a list of questions to present to the locals. Soon enough, with the help of local forces cooperating with village elders, the grievance was resolved. This is just one example of the data collected during research being fed into the tactical stream.

The researcher also learned how to take advantage of work programs created for local Afghans to form impromptu focus groups. One of the goals of the local ISAF commander was to provide all adult males with work everyday. He realized that each day the community members would be divided into manageable groups of between ten or twelve as they awaiting their assignment or to be paid. He was given permission to converse with these groups on a fairly regular basis. While it was not a controlled focus group, it was an excellent opportunity for the researcher to build a personal relationship with the locals. The feelings of the locals were then exposed to the highly keen and interested researcher. In the presenter's words, one of the "pillars of trust is that you have to show the other person that their interests are important to you." Over time they became more willing to talk openly and frankly.
As the presenter developed close relationships with the local elders, he would attempt to organize structured interviews and polling when possible. The village elders would be asked to gather a group of people that could speak frankly to the researcher. And while it was requested by the researcher that the group be composed of volunteers, it was more often than not decided by the elder who would and would not attend.

The researcher attempted to group interviews by hierarchical cross-section so that elders and subordinates did not mix. Equality in the sessions was important to ensure that each member was able to contribute to the conversation. Otherwise the elder would simply dominate the discussion. When this was achieved, the researcher learned that what worked best was a "rolling conversation" whereby both parties would ask each other questions back and forth until everyone was satisfied.

The researcher encountered four main hurdles. First, analyzing the data was difficult and community-specific. Making inferential stipulations about the wider region was impossible. While correlations could be made from one community to another, at times, these ties were rarely firm enough to make any broad generalizations. Second, the presenter regretted not ensuring that the collected data would be compatible with the superseding organization's methodological standards. Third, translation between the local language and English meant that there was a never-ending gap in the understanding that one party had of the other. No two translators are the same. Fourth, the amount of time a given task would require was could never be predicted because of transportation and security issues. And fifth, the role of the human effects advisor within the larger brigade unit is inevitably uncertain. While the positions are under development to ensure that there is continuity in skills and standards, there is still much work to be done.

1.5.2 Survey Application for Campaign Analysis

The next presenter has a background in physics and academia, but was an operational analysis for Joint Task Force South during late 2008 and early 2009. During the deployment he developed a technique where causal relationships between opinions and environmental wartime factors were analyzed. The quality of campaign evaluation is premised largely on the understanding of correlations. Of note, during the demonstration the presenter was unable to provide a real dataset because of classification restrictions.

Afghanistan is a complex system and cannot subsequently be understood by simple analysis. Many of the dynamics seen in Afghanistan between individuals is premised on the theory of collective behaviour. To use a biological example, "slime mold" are organisms that band together when resources become scarce

in order to act collectively. The cohesion of the Taliban is no different. Nor is the group response on behalf of civilians an NATO forces to counter the Taliban.

Considering the complexity of the region, the group responses are remarkably straight-forward and rational. But simple analysis will still not suffice. As he says, citing a popular scientific saying, “simple systems give rise to complex behaviour. Complex systems give rise to simple behaviour. And most important, the laws of complexity hold universally, caring not at all for the details of a system’s constituent atoms.”

When Afghans are threatened, therefore, they group together and band together and begin to show similar characteristics. This is especially exemplified when looking at the availability of food in Afghanistan. For instance, between the years 2000 and 2005, 39% of children under the age of 5 suffered from malnutrition. The data in 2009 is not much better, with between 5% and 19% of children under 5 still suffering from malnutrition of varying severities.
Using the mock data set from February 2008 to May 2009, the presenter goes on to argue that within the period of analysis about 50% of Afghans in Kandahar province were not satisfied with the food situation. Further, 25% of respondents complained about the quality and quantity of roads and bridges, while a significant 90% of people were not happy with the lack of available electricity. Familiar with this sort of data, development planners will frequently take action on the things that are easiest to fix. This means that there will be a greater push to bring electricity than food to the people. However, a complaint rate of 50% for availability of food is significant and much more pressing than the other grievances. Food, after all, is required for survival. Roads and electricity are not.

In order to begin analysis of correlations a preliminary poll used “redundancy to check for consistency” by questioning if Afghans thought the impact of ISAF was positive or negative, and whether or not the impact of ISAF was perceived as positive or negative. When mapping correlations between the two questions, there was indeed a likelihood that those who thought that the mission had a ‘positive impact’ on Afghanistan also had a ‘positive opinion’ of ISAF.

Going back to the issue of food availability, in order to connect food availability and the approval of the ISAF mission, the results from asking about the positive opinion of ISAF and the question of enough food were plotted against one another. A strong correlation was found. Support for the Afghanistan government and the availability of food also revealed a correlation, although it was slightly weaker than the former. Several other correlations were also found using alternative data points (see the presenter’s paper). In all cases, where there was enough food there was also increased support for the mission and/or the Afghan government.

This data can be broken down by region and local correlations can be mapped. The slope of these correlations can be used to analyze one region to another in general terms. And, significantly, the same process can be used for other markers (ie: electricity, security, healthcare, education, drinking water, and roads).

However, it is crucial to understand that these correlations are not necessarily causalities. The bare data can only be extrapolated so far. Perhaps a third factor drives all these correlations. After all, if Afghans demand roads and they are given roads, the availability of food will also rise. So it may be more productive to look at correlations in a much broader scope where most major issues facing Afghans are included (security, education, food, healthcare, electricity, roads, drinking water and employment). If individual polling data were to exist for each variable, and if there are samples from different periods of time, the “rate of change of satisfaction with ISAF” can be calculated (again, see the full report for a breakdown of how this is done). This, however, reveals the crux of this analysis: the understanding of functional dependencies whereby outcomes will rely on a number of variables tracked over time. From

there, with the incorporation of more than just one variable, causal dedications can indeed be made.

In conclusion, perhaps complex systems that characterize Afghanistan can be analyzed. One possibility is by doing what this presentation has done: using a technique that can make causal deductions about collective human opinions that depend on multiple factors and their fluctuations over time. More firmly, it also states that functional dependencies (for example, the ties between a number of environmental variables and overall opinion of the mission) remain constant over time even as the poll data itself inevitably fluctuates.

1.5.3 Methodological Issues for Surveying Closed Societies

The presenter represented a Canadian polling firm with experience in academia, private research, and business. Polling agencies exist to conduct research of a group on behalf of third-party organizations. In this case, the presenter has experience conducting interviews on controversial topics within specific religious and cultural groups.

This presentation looked at the role of surveys that use focus groups as their engine. It inquired about the purpose of such research, what the barriers or risks of doing it, what are the solutions, and look at several cases domestically that dealt with sensitive topics.

There are a number of benefits to conducting polls and surveys. First of all, polls uncover a "measurement of the distribution of opinion or attitudes" perhaps more accurately than other forms of research. Second, they reveal a measurement of the correlates and non-correlates, and by extension, a range of causalities where certain drivers can be identified. It also serves to dispel assumed casualties through empirical research.

But there are also a number of barriers. The largest issue is the interests and agendas of those who fund the research. Private organizations simply do not want their assumptions disputed. Public organizations are afraid of making headlines in a negative light.

The second barrier comes from Research Ethics Boards in universities that are "casinos" by their very nature whereby the board members are randomly selected with perhaps little background in the research under question, and have the power to "unethically change a research model in the name of ethics." Further, conflicts of interest are inevitable as one professor will be a competitor of another.

One solution is to conduct human research outside of the university setting in an ethical way. In the presenters case he left academia in order to conduct meaningful research without undue scrutiny from Research Ethics Boards. Another option is to conduct research with a think tank.

Concerning actual research design, the main concern of pollsters and surveyors is whether or not their respondents are telling the truth. This is especially so in non-permissive environments. The presenter emphasized that research among conflict-prone communities is simply another branch of non-reactive research. One message that has been echoed all throughout this study is the importance of respondents being comfortable. This leads to honest answers even if the thoughts revealed as impermissible. If respondents are uncomfortable they more easily lie, especially if there is a perception that they should feel strongly in a certain way. Everyone, no matter of demographic, is able to lie to a researcher. The researcher must then understand and "think about how you can get respondents comfortable… and think about how you can give them permission to speak candidly."

When attempting to recruit a specific cultural or identifiable group the key is to begin the conversation in

a general way. The presenter gave an example of attempting to arrange for a women's Muslim-Canadian focus group. In the pre-screening call, the question of religion would be one of the last on the questionnaire. Hide the crucial question amongst a sea of others. If one were to ask religion at the outset it would almost immediately be confrontational, and you could risk under-sampling and changing the respondent's mindset. This is called non-reactive recruitment. Further, the focus group itself should take place in a reassuring venue, should accommodate different genders fairly (for example, by having a female researcher lead a women-only focus group), and to avoid using traditional recording and uncomfortable procedures typically used in focus groups.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is to keep a broad scope in the questioning so that those in attendance are not sure of what data you are striving for, and so that the researcher has a number of points of comparison. For example, two focus groups were conducted to analyze Muslim's opinion of security issues in Canada. The first was a cross-section of Muslims nationwide. The second was a group of Chinese Muslims in the same city. In both cases deep differences in the feelings among certain groups were revealed. Paradoxes were equally revealed. While at some points, for example, a Jordanian Muslim would be pro-Palestinian, the same individual was pro-Israel when the discussion turned towards democratic governance in the Middle East. The line of questioning was broad enough that both responses could be expressed therefore giving the research more data and points of comparison.

The bottom line is actually quite simple: in this line of research paradoxes do exist because of the human condition. If respondents answer freely then perhaps the data will make a lot less sense than one would think otherwise at the outset. But people do not answer freely naturally. It takes careful research design and planning.

1.5.4 Questions and Discussion

Question 1: How often do surveys and focus groups provide different or conflicting data?

Speaker 3: There is overlap between the two types of investigation, but more often the focus group is wrong. When they are with other people, members of a focus group are likely to say something different than what they might say in private. Although researchers often use focus groups, they should interpret the data realizing that it may be less truthful than direct survey data.

Mediator: Focus groups often involve a peer validation of information. This was the view brought forward in the first panel. So rather than focus groups being less reliable, in some situations they can actually be a way in which to provide the most accurate information available to the researcher. There are two distinctive views on this.

Question 2: What preparation is necessary for a researcher that is going into a culturally distinct environment? And is it realistic for researchers to be active without proper cultural sensitivities?

Speaker 2: The right researchers who can do the work quickly and effectively need to be selected. They need to have the right educational background and have the right pre-deployment training.

Speaker 3: Research design is far more important than research analysis – "design effects the results." All variables impact the results, including the name of the firm, nationality and gender of the investigator, and subjects where you will hardly ever get truthful answers (for example, personal sexual history). These are all design issues.

Speaker 1: The issue of knowing about the behaviour that is occurring is extremely difficult. You must

have people available that can help you interpret all cultural behavioural issues. Cultural bias never really goes away but with the correct planning you can relieve some of the uncertainties that would exist otherwise.

Question 3: What mechanisms exist to eliminate military bias?

Speaker 1: There certainly was a military bias in surveys conducted in Afghanistan. There was pressure to produce "something" – especially to deliver data that would be compatible with the operational design model. The military wanted the researcher to produce a list of problems so that they could act on the research. In terms of real bias controls, there were interpreters and cultural advisors. The interpreters were good at reading their own people, and when it came down to really difficult and complex situations, cultural advisors were brought in so that military bias could be eliminated, or at least identified.

Question 4: All presentations were focused on populations. Can you comment on how you can attempt human affects in terms of the surrounding environment? And, secondly, can mathematical models be used (as in the presentation by speaker 2) in permissive environments?

Speaker 2: In Canada we do not get the same degree of collective behaviour as in Afghanistan. We are not a stressed society and nor in a complex system. Sometimes complex circumstances are easier to analyze by virtue of their members' collectivity than in situations where individuals do as they wish.

Speaker 1: War gaming provides adequate experience to look at human interaction and the surrounding environment.

Speaker 3: Surveys are done in all sorts of terrible and open societies. The British Broadcasting Commission, for example, is one of the world's largest buyers of surveys. The question then becomes, why are they being done? Speaking abstractly, they are more risky for correlation than for distribution. You can have the wrong distribution of answers and the right causal model. How do we improve the right distribution of answers? First, you pay attention to cultural sensitivities. Second, you improve the questionnaire by using non-verbal scales by using variations of number scales. It tends to reduce the risk of cultural bias. Third, you verify by conducting behaviour analysis. What bothered speaker 3 about the second presentation was the possibility of tautology depending on how the respondent is instructed. It might make more sense to measure the amount of food available by the actual amount of food physically located in each district rather than their reported satisfaction with food. Something that is clearly independent is needed to ensure confidence.

Moderator: With regard to the question about where else this research is done, there are all sorts of correlation exercises that work in the social sciences. However, there are no systematic reviews for the management and control of systematic violence. It is a failure of the system in which we study. It is time we got a handle on this and started to develop a systematic approach to the analysis of violence. Question 1: How often is the dataset that is attained different between surveys and focus groups?

Speaker 3: There is overlap between the two types of investigation, but more often the focus group is wrong. When with other people those on a focus group are likely to say something different than what they would otherwise say in private. While researchers do focus groups often they should interpret the data realizing that it may be less truthful than direct survey data.

Mediator: Focus groups often involve a peer validation of information. This was the view brought forward in the first panel. So rather than focus groups being less reliable, in some situations they can actually be a way in which to provide the most accurate information available to the researcher. There are two distinctive views on this.

Question 2: What preparation is necessary for a researcher that is going into a culturally distinct environment? And is it realistic for researchers to be active without proper cultural sensitivities?
Speaker 2: The right researchers who can do the work quickly and effectively need to be selected. They need to have the right educational background and have the right pre-deployment training.

Speaker 3: Research design is far more important than research analysis – "design effects the results." All variables impact the results, including the name of the firm, nationality and gender of the investigator, and subjects where you will hardly ever get truthful answers (for example, personal sexual history). These are all design issues.

Speaker 1: The issue of knowing about the behaviour that is occurring is extremely difficult. You must have people available that can help you interpret all cultural behavioural issues. Cultural bias never really goes away but with the correct planning you can relieve some of the uncertainties that would exist otherwise.

Question 3: What mechanisms exist to eliminate military bias?

Speaker 1: There certainly was a military bias. There was pressure to produce "something" – especially to deliver data that would be compatible with the operational design model. The military wanted the researcher to produce a list of problems so that they could act on the research. In terms of real bias controls, interpreters and cultural advisors. The interpreters were good at reading their own people, and when it came down to really difficult and complex situations, cultural advisors were brought in so that military bias could be eliminated.

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Speaker 1: War gaming provides adequate experience to look at human interaction and the surrounding environment.

Speaker 3: Surveys are done in all sorts of terrible places and in open societies. The British Broadcasting Commission, for example, is one of the world's largest buyers of surveys. The question then becomes, why are they being done? Speaking abstractly, it is more likely that a survey will find false correlations than a false distribution of answers. But surveys can also have an accurate causal model, but present inaccurate distribution data. How do we improve the accuracy of the distribution of answers? First, you pay attention to cultural sensitivities. Second, you improve the questionnaire by using non-verbal scales and variations of number scales. It tends to reduce the risk of cultural bias. Third, you verify by conducting behaviour analysis. What bothered speaker 3 about the second presentation was the possibility of tautology depending on how the respondent is instructed. It might make more sense to measure the amount of food available by the actual amount of food physically located in each district rather than their reported satisfaction with food. Something that is clearly independent is needed to ensure confidence.

Moderator: With regard to the question about where else this research is done, there are all sorts of correlation exercises in the social sciences. However, there are no systematic reviews of scientific studies relevant to the management and control of systematic violence, such as the reviews of the Cochrane collaboration in medicine or the Campbell collaboration in social science. It is a failure of the system within which we study. It is time we started to develop a systematic approach to the analysis of violence.

1.6 Practitioner Feedback

1.6.1 Other Government Departments – first speaker

The second speaker had personal knowledge of sociological research and several government departments. Public Safety is the federal department responsible for emergency management, crime prevention, national security, corrections, law enforcement, and policing, as well as border security and various other specific areas. Within the Public Safety portfolio are included various agencies such as CSIS, the RCMP, Canada Border Services Agency, Correctional Services of Canada, National Parole Board, and others. There is a research and academic relations section in the strategic policy branch. There is a fund for research which is currently being used to fund research on violent extremism. We have funded a comparative study of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, and France, but most of our research focuses on Canada. The research involved a study of violent extremists, non-violent extremists, and a control group. The speaker's research expertise lies in work with vulnerable populations, including those with mental illness, disabilities, low incomes, recent immigrants, first nations and Inuit communities. Much of the discussion is familiar from this background.

To begin by reinforcing some of the issues discussed, several speakers have raised research dilemmas and ethical questions. It is essential to build a trusting relationship, but this can be time-consuming and difficult. A breach of trust involves a moral issue, but also a practical one. Once you betray trust in a tightly connected community, no one in that community will participate in research again. So a breach of trust affects not only the subjects but also all their circle of contacts.

There are legal as well as ethical issues when doing research with people in conflict with the law. Researchers have to be very clear about the requirement to report under legislation.

It was interesting to hear that focus groups can act as a check on the information collected in individual interviews. People's perceptions can often be different from realities. For example, seniors in Canada are the group that perceives crime as the greatest problem, but statically, they are the group that experiences crime the least. These perceptions may originate with media, family, peers, schools, and so on, and this becomes the narrative that research picks up, so the use of multiple methods is essential. Any single method can result in a distorted view of an event or situation. Most academic research tends to focus on a narrow aspect using a single method, presented in the context of a particular body of research literature. We need more accessible overviews.

It is also important to be honest about what does not work. It is very difficult for academics or government officials to admit failure, because funding and reputation can ride on results, yet we learn as much or more from failures than we do from success.

We know that humans are complex, and one person can hold several contrary views on a research subject, potentially making a mockery of simple questionnaires or single-answer surveys.

There was a question about whether policy is related to research; they are integrally related, from the point of view of Public Safety. The sort of research discussed at this workshop is inherently of interest to

policymakers; we do research to inform policy and operational decision-making. Policy considerations are therefore used to define research design and processes. Who does the research is also important. Perception, status, race, gender, and motivation all influence the results that will be obtained. The answers will be shaped by the identity of the questioner. We can get around these issues by using a variety of different kinds of researchers in the field. Each different researcher may have different access. For example, research on women living on low incomes built partnerships with organizations that had worked with them, with aboriginal researchers who had worked with first nations communities, and with an NGO. These organizations were legitimate and respected, and so the results had greater validity. You cannot assume that these organizations are legitimate just because of their mandate and title. You have to research how long they have been there, what they actually do, and who has research qualifications.

Qualitative and quantitative indicators are both useful and should always be combined. Quantitative indicators do not provide good measures of experience, motivation, or causality. Qualitative studies, on the other hand, do not provide good measures of the extent of phenomena that may be discovered in interviews. We need to think differently about what research is and how we use its results; how do we get it to the places where it will usefully influence policy?

Creativity should be used in the choice of research partners. Hiring members of a particular population as research assistants helps to build a longitudinal component into any study. In one study of women using food banks, the problem of a transient population was addressed by hiring members of the target population as research assistants, training them in collection techniques, and using them to recruit subjects, with considerable success.

There has been a conference sponsored by Public Safety Canada on doing sensitive research, and there is some interest in continuing this line of inquiry.

1.6.2 Other Government Departments – second speaker

The second speaker had served as an analyst and trainer in several government departments, and is particularly familiar with the Privy Council Office – a central agency, headed by the Clerk of the Privy Council, the most senior civil servant, reporting to Cabinet and the Prime Minister. He is also familiar with work by security intelligence organizations. From his perspective, the workshop might help participants to be better consumers of research, better researchers, or better trainers to develop analysts who might use social research.

The first and last panels were the most useful for this speaker, because they were the areas least known to him. It is important to recognize that we often base our knowledge of other countries on very unrepresentative samples. This issue is often buried in the research that we look at; we make unwarranted assumptions about the type of populations from which the relevant data are drawn.

The last panel touched on the strength of a correlation and consequences. This is a major issue in the analytical community. If there are severe consequences for an accusation of money laundering, for example, then it must only be made on fairly solid grounds. We may not always ensure sufficiently high confidence given the severity of the implications of our conclusions.

The use of intermediaries is a particularly useful technique, which bears more examination. For example, how do we find out whether companies are being victimized by foreign governments interested in appropriating their technology? Companies don't like to volunteer this information; it looks bad, erodes shareholder confidence, CEOs can be fired, and so on. So we are challenged to find indirect measures to examine the phenomena. We found that a lot of the illicit activity is invisible, and we were trying to find out which aspects of it left a discernible trail. We invested a lot in developing people who had a better

understanding of the milieu, and verifying whether or not these indirect indicators were significant. We tried to be creative in devising ways to measure things that you couldn't measure directly.

Analysts need better tools to understand closed and covert groups, engaged in activities like organized crime or terrorism. They are not going to have the time or expertise of anthropologists or social scientists, but need simplified practical tools for generalists. We have developed a checklist for understanding groups. It is a list of simple questions such as how is the group constituted, are there factions, how is power distributed in the group, how do they communicate to one another… this is basic. When we examine groups, we rapidly understand that they are more complex than at first impression; details reveal that they are not homogeneous, there are factions and histories, and this becomes useful information. Any further guidance on how to examine groups would be a very useful outcome.

1.6.3 Canadian Forces and DND – first speaker

The third speaker represented an intelligence planning organization in an upper echelon military headquarters. One of his functions has been to provide cultural and intelligence support to operations, and information operations, both in uniform and as a civilian since 2004, so Afghan operations have shaped his understanding. He is well positioned to contribute a perspective from the realm of military operations.

We know now, looking back at six years of Afghan operations, that we got it wrong. We were focusing on counter terrorism, when we should have been engaging in counter insurgency operations. Information operations and influence activities are not well understood. We know very little about how to influence groups, how group behaviour is shaped. When we created organizations in the Canadian Forces for information and influence operations, they became marginalized, and because they became marginalized, their voice was lost and with every rotation that passed through Afghanistan, there was no continuity, no learning, lessons were lost. We are just now beginning to understand that it is a complex system. We need to bring the social science, the intelligence, and the operational understanding together to form a single picture on which a commander can base decisions to achieve an effect. Measures of effectiveness also have to consider the commander's intent. What are we trying to achieve?

Social science research can make a difference by helping planners to get into the cognitive plane. How do people feel about things? How do we bring this to bear? Once we have this understanding, there is a more controversial question – how do we target? Organizations have not addressed this question. There is also the problem of "expertise". The last rotation becomes the pool for expertise, but we still don't know much.

We need some sort of organizational standardization, and we have developed a Canadian Forces Table of Equipment and Organization for the mission, identifying specific skill sets. It is easy to identify soldier skills like shooting and driving, but keep in mind that this is counter insurgency, not a conventional fight. We have been less effective in teaching cultural sensitivities. This is connected to a problem with critical thinking. We seem to have lost this ability, and have difficulty getting into the enemy's decision cycle. Faced with urgent operational need, we need social science operations research; we do not have the luxury of designing the ideal social experiment, and being indulgent about academic standards. We need responsive operational research to support the commander's intent. If the research is designed right, its results will increase the success of our operations.

The speaker concluded with a number of challenging questions. Now that Afghanistan is effectively over as a military operation, what is next? What will the operational environment look like in the future? Will the techniques identified for Afghanistan be applicable to other cultures and contexts? What do analysts

and intelligence collectors need in their toolboxes to get them ready for the next operation? Social science research is now generally falling under the J2, intelligence staff, but is that the best place for it? It is clear that we need more experience on the ground; can we pay people to go into remote areas, ride the rails and trails, stay in hostels and people's houses, learn first hand? We can't afford to just focus on the present. Can we do predictive research that will help to focus planners on the right areas for the future?

1.6.4 Canadian Forces and DND – second speaker

The penultimate speaker works in the sponsoring organization, the Adversarial Intent Section of Defence Research and Development, and is an advisory to the Collaborative Performance and Learning Section at DRDC Toronto, but has also worked recently in military-political liaison in Afghanistan. He appreciates the value of a lengthy familiarization of the sort described the researcher on Rwanda, because that is seldom afforded to deployed personnel. The requirement for language and culture raises the question of whether personnel who need this can ever be prepared adequately, or do they have to be selected for the attributes that they will need for their work? Civil military cooperation, psychological operations, and human intelligence work clearly require careful selection, but this is a quick fix rather than an extravagant professional development program, and it may not produce the result we are looking for.

We are exploring the SWEAT team concept, human terrain analysis, and red team concepts. Trust building and relationship building are extremely important. Is six months long enough for a people from an alien culture to fundamentally change institutions? Would our operations be different if we deployed key personnel for one or two years rather than six months?

Incorporating social science into every level of what we do in the Canadian Forces, and particularly in counter-insurgency, is critical. The speaker was left with an urge to rewrite how soldiers are trained for operations. It is one thing to sneak up to a bridge and draw a picture to decide what sort of bomb to drop on it. This is such a Cold War approach. Now we have to shift our understanding so that we can send a patrol leader out to come back with a picture of the human terrain that is meaningful, so that the operational analysis is informed by a patrol report that is written with real understanding. Whether you call it a *shura* or a key leader engagement, it is still a focus group, and it is still a semi-structured meeting. Incorporating that thinking into the Canadian Forces is very important.

Comments from CSIS and academics are appreciated. We all have problems with who is responsible for what. The food security problem, for example, hinges on functions which are not part of the military mission. The military is so focused on delivering results that conflicts between organizations about who should do what inevitably arise.

We need to know more about how the shadow government works, and what the Taliban shadow government does. For many people in Afghanistan, we are the insurgency. So we need research methods to understand how we affect these indigenous structures. Social science research is the enabler. Putting a battle group and a PRT and an OMLT in a large region is counter insurgency on the cheap. You can't win without security, and security requires boots on the ground, but then we have to understand what impact that has. Operations on the cheap are not the way to win.

1.7 Concluding Words

The chair noted that the four panels had not addressed directly the question of understanding the effects of our actions on the adversary, or the intent of the adversary, but the speakers had provided insight into the ways in which social research could be done in hostile, dangerous, and deceptive environments, which it can be assumed apply to dealings with any potential adversary.

The sponsor began by noting that he had not expected to solve all the problems of measuring adversary intent at this workshop. We have heard a lot of discussion of the challenges of research, some of which are controllable. One of the challenges we have is moving research from the field or laboratory to products that are operationally and doctrinally useful for the environments in which the Canadian Forces are deployed.

We heard a lot of good ideas today, which might suggest where we take our research program in the future.

He concluded by thanking Matthew Lauder for instigating this project, the participants, and the organizers and administrative support at the Royal Military College.

List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms

AFRICOM	Africa Command [US]
AUSTRAC	Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CBSA	Canada Border Services Agency
CEFCOM	Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command
CENTCOM	Central Command [US]
CEO	Chief executive officer
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CMA	Certified Management Accountant
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CRA	Canada Revenue Agency
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DND	Department of National Defence
DRDC	Defence Research & Development Canada
DRDC	Defence Research and Development Canada
DRDKIM	Director Research and Development Knowledge and Information Management
DSRI	Defence and Security Research Institute
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FINCEN	Financial Crimes Enforcement Network [US]
FINTRAC	Financial Transactions Reports Analysis Centre
GFF	Global Finance Forum
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITAC	Integrated Threat Assessment Centre
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MURI	multidisciplinary university research initiative
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PACOM	Pacific Command [US]
R&D	Research & Development
RUF	Revolutionary United Front [Sierra Leone]

SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOCA	Serious Organized Crime Agency
SSTR	Security, stability, transition and reconstruction
SWEAT	Small Worlds Ethnographic Assessment Team
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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Étudier des milieux hostiles, trompeurs et dangereux – Rapport concernant un atelier sur les méthodes de recherche sociale en milieu non permissif (U)

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(U) A one−day workshop was held at RMC to explore social research methods for hostile, difficult, deceptive and dangerous environments within which government pursues security objectives. Four panels addressed: qualitative anthropological methods within a theatre; financial analysis to assess the environment surrounding a theatre; police tools in domestic operations; and the use of polls and surveys in difficult environments. A final session permitted practitioners to comment on the material. Practitioners, academics, and government officials discussed these issues without being individually identified. Interviews, focus groups, combat ethnography, and insider−outsider research can help to map social microcosms within a theatre. Financial analysis tools can help to provide a more comprehensive context for these microcosms, and also track individuals and enterprises with security implications. Police tools are tailored to find usable evidence and domestic courts shape practice, limiting applicability of these tools to foreign operations. Polls and surveys should be tailored to the social context of their targets and validated. Often indirect questions are more effective. Practitioners confirmed the importance of multi−method approaches, and close cooperation between field and ‘lab’ to bring critical social science into practice.

(U) Un atelier d'une journée a été tenu au CMR pour explorer des méthodes sociales de recherches pour les environnements hostiles, difficiles, trompeurs et dangereux dans lesquels le gouvernement poursuit des objectifs de sécurité. Quatre panneaux ont adressé : méthodes anthropologiques qualitatives dans un théâtre ; analyse financière pour évaluer l'environnement entourant un théâtre outils de police dans des exécutions domestiques ; et l'utilisation des sondages dans les environnements difficiles. Une session finale a permis à des praticiens de présenter ses observations sur le matériel. Les praticiens, les universitaires, et les fonctionnaires de gouvernement ont discuté ces issues sans être individuellement identifié. Les entrevues, les groupes cibles, l'ethnographie de combat, et la recherche d'initié étranger peuvent aider à tracer les microcosmes sociaux dans un théâtre. Les outils d'analyse financière peuvent aider à fournir un cadre plus complet pour ces microcosmes, et identifient également des individus et des entreprises avec des implications de sécurité. Des outils de police sont spécialisés pour trouver l'évidence utilisable. Vue que les cours domestiques forment la pratique, ces outils ne sont pas très applicables aux opérations étrangères. Des sondages devraient êtres conçus en fonction du contexte social de leurs cibles et devrait être validés. Les questions indirectes sont souvent plus pertinentes. Les praticiens ont réaffirmé l'importance des approches de multi méthode, et de la collaboration étroite entre la zone et laboratoire pour apporter la science social critique en pratique.

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(U) Anthropology, social science, cultural analysis, human terrain, non−permissive environments, operational support, qualitative and quantitative research methods

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